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Demutualization of Financial
Exchanges: Business as Usual?
By Caroline Bradley*
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2000, OM Gruppen, the owner of the Stockholm Stock Ex-
change made a hostile tender offer for the London Stock Exchange,
Europe's largest stock exchange. The London Stock Exchange fought a
vigorous battle to fend off the offer, and was ultimately successful.1 The
London Stock Exchange was vulnerable to take-over because it had fol-
lowed the growing trend among financial exchanges to change from a mu-
tual business structure to a shareholder-owned for-profit business structure.
This article examines the ways in which such structural changes in the or-
ganization of exchanges implicates public interest concerns.2 The article
considers ways in which these concerns may be mitigated.
The article begins by outlining some of the history of mutual business
forms, and the recent demutualization movement. Then, after examining
the idea of exchanges as proprietary businesses, the article examines three
new problems caused by demutualization: how shares in an exchange will
be traded; how a proprietary exchange can function as a regulator; and the
risk that a proprietary exchange will become a take-over target. The article
concludes that there is no perfect arrangement for trading in an exchange's
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Thanks to Michael Froomkin,
Stephen Halpert, Frances Hill, and Roberta Karmel for helpful comments. I would like to
thank Angie Padin for research assistance. © Caroline Bradley 2001. All rights reserved.
This article is not intended to reflect developments after March 2001.
'See, e.g., London Stock Exchange Defence Document, 1 (Oct. 2000), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/defence/pdfs/80898.PDF (last visited Feb.16, 2001).
2 See, e.g., TECH. COMM., INT'L. ORG. OF SECS. COMM'NS, Discussion Paper on Stock
Exchange Demutualization, 1 (Dec.2000) available at
http://www.iosco.org/download/pdf/2000-stock-exchangedemutualization.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2001) ("A fair and efficient capital market is a public good. A well-run exchange is
a key part of the capital market.").
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shares; that, if proprietary exchanges are allowed to act as regulators, they
should be subject to some constraints as to how they perform this function;
and that, contrary to the ordinary case where we have reason to believe that
markets discipline firms, a vigorous market for control of exchanges could
have harmful effects. The concern that underlies these conclusions is a
concern that a country's national interest in protecting its domestic capital
markets for the benefit of domestic enterprise and investors is likely to be
undermined in a world where exchanges act just like any other business. 3
Financial exchanges developed as informal collective organizations of
traders in particular financial instruments in many jurisdictions.4 Over time,
the exchanges developed their own rules and procedures.5 Subsequently,
the states in which these informal, collective organizations were based
moved to regulate financial exchanges, usually as part of a more general
regulation of financial and investment activity. Today, regulation of finan-
cial exchanges is based on the idea that investors will only trade financial
instruments in markets which work properly, which are not rife with fraud,
which have accurate information about the price of the financial instruments
readily available, and in which trading, clearing, and settlement procedures
are efficient.7 Because exchanges are an important element in the capital
formation process, they must be seen to be clean.8 The public interest9 in
3 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into Shares: Implications of Demutualiza-
tion for the Regulation of Stock Exchanges, paper presented at the AALS Annual Meeting in
January, 2000 ("A non-profit organization enjoys a greater aura of acting in the public inter-
est than does a for-profit corporation. There is a risk that turning exchanges into ordinary
public companies, likely to have much smaller capitalizations than their listed companies,
will undermine public confidence in these symbols of capitalism.").
4 Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization, supra note 2, at 1 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2001) (stating "[h]istorically, most exchanges were not-for-profit organizations
owned by their members").
5 See, e.g., Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860 27 J.
LEG. STUD. 113, 132 (1998) ("From its inception, the New York Stock and Exchange Board
operated a miniature legal system, with its own rules governing securities trading and its
own mechanism for resolving trade-related disputes.").
6 See, e.g., Paul Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L REv. 1453, 1457 (1997)
("for most exchanges, comprehensive governmental regulation of rules and procedures is a
twentieth-century phenomenon."). In the U.S., securities markets are regulated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (the "Exchange Act"); in the U.K.,
exchanges are currently regulated under §§ 36-41, 119-120 Financial Services Act 1986,
1986 Ch. 60. §§ 285-300 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 2000 Ch. 8, will replace
the provisions of the 1986 Act when the 2000 Act comes into force.
7 One of the U.K. Financial Services Authority's primary objectives is to maintain inves-
tor confidence in the financial system. See § 2 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, su-
pra note 6 (establishing the FSA's regulatory objectives) (not yet in force) available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000008.htm. Section 3(2) of the Act
makes it clear that the "financial system" includes "financial markets and exchanges".
8 "The FSA aims to maintain efficient, orderly and clean financial markets and help retail
consumers achieve a fair deal." Financial Services Authority Press Release, Consultation
launched on changes to the U.K. listing regime, FSA/PN/007/2001, Jan. 17, 2001, available
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ensuring the ready availability of capital for productive enterprise requires
that financial exchanges must be regulated, but there are issues about how
that regulation should be carried out.
Many states have adopted systems for the regulation of exchange activ-
ity that rely, at least partly, on self-regulation. 0 Self-regulation allows
regulators to defer to the expertise of exchange participants about what
rules and procedures are necessary to make the exchanges work.1 Ex-
changes are, therefore, a locus of collision between the private and the pub-
lic, often combining private membership or ownership with responsibilities
that have public characteristics. 12 They are important national assets that
serve public and private interests.13
Ownership structures of exchanges have also reflected public and pri-
vate elements: in different societies, exchanges have been privately consti-
tuted structures or organizations created by an act of the state.14 Where
at http:llvww.fsa.gov.uk/pubslpress/2001/007.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2001). Cf TECH.
COMM., INT'L ORG. OF SECS COMM'NS, Supervisory Framework for Markets (May 1999),
available at http://ww.iosco.org/download/pdf/1999-supervisoryfor markets.pdf, 2 (last
visited Feb. 26, 2001) ("Regulators in all markets acknowledge that investors want fair, hon-
est and orderly markets. Thus, the integrity of the markets is an important matter of public
interest and regulators should take actions that promote these objectives of fair and efficient
capital markets.").
9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b ("transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon se-
curities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest
which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions and of
practices and matters related thereto").
1o See, e.g., INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, Objectives and Principles of Securities
Regulation, ii, (May 1998) available at
http://www.iosco.org/download/pdf/1998-objectives-eng.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2001)
("The regulatory regime should make appropriate use of Self-Regulatory Organizations
(SROs) that exercise some direct oversight responsibility for their respective areas of compe-
tence, to the extent appropriate to the size and complexity of the markets.")
t1 See, e.g., SRO Consultative Comm., Int'l Org. of Secs. Comm'ns, Model for Effective
Regulation, 4 (May 2000) available at
http:llvwv.iosco.orgtdownload/pdf/2000-effectiveself-regulation.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2001) (noting that "In an environment characterized by a variety of different markets and
different types of participants, a specialized and thorough knowledge is very beneficial.").
1 Although cf Richard Grasso's comment that: "Anachronistic views of the Exchange as
a quasi-public utility have no place in today's world." Richard A. Grasso, Chairman And
Chief Executive Officer, NYSE, before the Senate Banking Committee Hearing on Septem-
ber 28, 1999, available at http://wwv.nyse.com/events/NT00024586.html (last visited Mar.
1,2001).
13 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1 IA(a)(l)(A), 15. U.S.C. § 78k-i(a) (de-
scribing the securities markets as "an important national asset which must be preserved and
strengthened.").
14 Ranald Michie states that a formal stock exchange was first created in Paris in 1724,
after the speculation provoked by John Law's activities. The Exchange's membership was
limited to 60 by the government. Ranald C. Michie, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE. A
HISTORY, 3 (1999).
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exchanges originated as spontaneous collective organizations, they have
taken the legal form of a mutual organization: in some jurisdictions ex-
changes were unincorporated associations, in others they were incorporated
mutual entities1 5 In the last few years, however, these exchanges have be-
gun to demutualize, to transform their business organization from a mutual
business form to a proprietary business form.16 In other urisdictions, stock
exchanges functioned historically as public institutions. The move to pri-
vate ownership of these exchanges' 8 is comparable to the movement to pri-
vatize state owned enterprises generally.19
Financial markets are not immune to globalization. 0 Exchanges are
engaged in cross border business, through listing securities of foreign issu-
ers, and through allowing foreign persons to trade through their facilities.
Members of exchanges may be multinational firms. Exchanges may them-
selves be multinational enterprises.21 So, it is not surprising that bodies that
15 For example, before its demutualization, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME")
was an Illinois not-for-profit corporation. See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc.,
Amendment No. 5 to Form S-4 Registration Statement, 4 (Apr. 25, 2000) available at
http://www.cme.com/news/cme.s-4.pdf (last visited Feb 15, 2001) [hereinafter "CME Reg-
istration Statement"].
16 The U.K.'s Treasury Select Committee described the distinction between mutual and
proprietary businesses as follows: "Mutual organisations are those whose owners and cus-
tomers are, generally speaking, the same people. They are distinguished from proprietary or-
ganisations, owned by a body of shareholders distinct, or largely distinct, from those who
have financial dealings with the organisation." Treasury Select Committee, Ninth Report,
Demutualisation, Volume I- Report and proceedings of the Committee, 1 HC 605-1 (July
27, 1999)(Session 1998-9), available at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselectcmtreasy/ 605/605
02.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
17 The Cayman Islands Stock Exchange (established 1997) is "a private limited company
owned by the Cayman Islands Government but operated as an independent entity."
http://www.csx.com.ky/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2001).
18 For example, the Athens Stock Exchange was established in 1876 under the Stock Ex-
change Law, based on the French Commercial Code, as a self-regulated public institution (In
1918, Law 1308 set up the Athens Stock Exchange as a public entity). The Exchange was
transformed into a joint stock company in 1995 by Law 2324 of 1995, and Law 2533 of
1997 laid the groundwork for its privatization, although the Greek State currently owns
48.3% of the exchange. Athens Stock Exchange Factbook, available at
http://www.ase.gr/FactBook.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
19 See, e.g., Andrei Schleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. OF ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 133 (1998) (discussing arguments against government ownership). Shleifer
suggests that non-profit firms are "a private alternative to profit-maximizing suppliers that
attenuates the incentives for quality-reducing cost-reduction". Id. at 140.
20 The global financial market is not a new phenomenon. See, e.g., Maurice Obstfeld, The
Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?, 12 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 9, 11 (1998)
(noting that "[b]efore World War I, a vibrant, free-wheeling capital market linked financial
centers in Europe, the western hemisphere, Oceania, Africa, and the Far East.").
2' Euronext is an exchange which is being formed through the merger of the Paris, Am-
sterdam, and Brussels Stock Exchanges. See, e.g., Euronext, The European "Hub" of the
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are responsible for harmonizing approaches to financial regulation should
have begun a process of developing agreement on the critical features of
regulation of financial exchanges .2  Increased competition between ex-
changes and non-exchange securities markets, exchange mergers, and de-
mutualizations raise issues at the international level, as well as at the
domestic level. These transnational issues are considered in Section VII,
but the article first examines mutual businesses, including exchanges, and
demutualization, from a domestic perspective.
II. MUTUAL BUSINESSES
Mutual businesses are businesses that are designed to be run by man-
agers for the benefit of their members. They differ from traditional partner-
ships and corporations in that the members do not have traditional
ownership rights in respect of the firm, nor do they typically have rights to
share in revenues of the business. Members have equal rights to participate
in decision-making.23 The business will accumulate revenues, rather than
distributing them.2 Mutuals trace their origins to medieval guilds in north-
ern Europe, which were member associations.25 These guilds were origi-
nally linked to the boroughs in which they were established, so were part of
a public authority, although they later separated from the boroughs and• 6
came to be seen as private. In contrast to the situation in northern Europe,
business activity in Italy was carried on through joint stock enterprises
characterized by investment of capital, rather than associations of people.27
Global Network, available at http://www.bourse-de-paris.fr/fr/sbf6/pdf/Euronext.pdf (last
visited Feb. 14, 2001).
22 See, e.g., Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8.
23 See, e.g., Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization, supra note 2, at 2
("Decisions are usually made on a one-member, one-vote basis."); Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act (1987) § 7.21.
24 See, e.g., Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987), § 13.01. Mutuals may be
allowed to purchase memberships if they do not become insolvent as a result, and may be
permitted to distribute funds to members on dissolution. Id. at § 13.02.
2s See, e.g., Swiss Re, Are Mutual Insurers an Endangered Species? Sigma No 4/99, 10
(1999) available at
http://www.swissre.comelpublicationslpublications/sigmal/sigma499.Paras.0002.File.pdf
(last visited Feb 22, 2001) ("European mutuals have their roots in the Middle Age guilds that
protected members and their families in the event of sickness or death. Even after the guilds
disbanded, they continued to function as mutual insurers."). On guilds, see, e.g., C. A.
Cooke, CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY, 21-31 (1951).26 See Cooke, supra note 25.
27 E. Hilton Young contrasted the use by the Italian business world ofjoint stock entities
with the Northern European Guild: "In northern Europe, on the other hand, commercial as-
sociation grew from a different root, and assumed a different form. The parent stock was the
Teutonic guild, which was an association of craftsmen for the purpose of their trade, and in
which, since the society was concerned not only with the business of its members, but with
the regulation of their whole lives, there was an association not of capital only, but of men."
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The joint stock company spread to Northern Europe by 1700, but its devel-
opment was slowed in England by the Bubble Act of 1720.28 During the
18th century a number of petitions for incorporation were rejected by the
Crown, and businesses were formed as partnerships instead.2' By the be-
ginning of the 19th century, there were increasing numbers of joint stock
companies in England.
3
Even after the joint stock company form was available for businesses,
the mutual form was sometimes attractive. The U.S. has seen mutual sav-
ings banks, trust companies, savings and loan associations, and credit un-
ions.31 Mutual insurance companies established in the U.S. in the mid 19h
century successfully challenged existing joint stock insurance companies by
32
cutting their prices. A number of insurance companies in the U.S. began
as stock companies and converted into mutuals at the beginning of the 20th
century after scandals at many life insurers.33 So the mutual business form
was a vehicle that could promote the trust of those who might deal with the
firn.
34
Some financial exchanges developed as mutual businesses before the
introduction of general incorporation statutes. For example, the London
Stock Exchange started in coffee houses in Change Alley, moving to a
building marked as "The Stock Exchange" in 1773, and charging an en-
E. Hilton Young, FOREIGN COMPANIES AND OTHER CORPORATIONS, 3 (1912). Stuart Bruchey
writes that the Italian innovations of commenda and societas maris "contributed to the suc-
cess of the English colonization effort in the seventeenth century and to the efficient conduct
of economic and business enterprise in America long after that." Stuart Bruchey,
ENTERPRISE, 12 (1990).
28 6 Geo. I, ch.18. See, e.g., Bishop Carleton Hunt, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESs
CORPORATION IN ENGLAND 1800-1867, 9 (1936) ("The act of 1720 and the ensuing collapse
of the great speculation arrested the development of joint-stock enterprise for many decades.
In sum and in consequence, incorporation remained particular, not general.").
29 See Hunt, supra note 28, at 11-13.
30 1d. at 15.
31 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE, 246-64 (1996).
32 See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 31, at 271 (noting that "the lower premiums charged
by the mutual companies do not seem explainable by advantages in avoiding moral hazard or
adverse selection on the part of the company's policyholders: the mutual companies, from
the beginning, were not really consumer-controlled entities, but rather were established and
run by managers who were essentially autonomous and self-perpetuating, and who simply
sold insurance policies on the market to strangers as did the investor-owned companies.").
3 See, e.g., Swiss Re, supra note 25, at 25. The document also notes similar develop-
ments in Canada and the U.K. Id.34 See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 31, at 248-49 (suggesting that, in the early 19th cen-
tury, individuals were unwilling to deposit their money in investor owned banks because
they were largely unregulated). The introduction of federal deposit insurance "decisively
eliminated any remaining advantage that mutual banks had over investor-owned banks in of-
fering safety to their depositors." Id. at 256.
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trance fee for admission.35 But the exchange "failed to control the London
securities market as it was neither exclusive not [sic] dominant". 36 In 1801
the Stock Exchange became a member organization.37 The closing of the
Stock Exchange to those who were not members was intended to enforce
discipline in the market, and to finance the enforcement of discipline.38 The
London Stock Exchange adopted its first set of rules and regulations in
1812 39 before the first general incorporation statute in England was enacted
in 1844.40 Before 1844 corporations were created by statute or by charter,
and other businesses took the form of deed of settlement companies.41 In
the early nineteenth century, Parliament also produced special legislation to
regulate various types of mutual enterprise, including building societies,42
and savings banks.43 Building societies formed in the U.K. during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as mutual organizations to facilitate
their members' home ownership.44 Maitland points out that, in 1877, a
Royal Commission suggested that the London Stock Exchange should be
incorporated, but that the Stock Exchange was not interested.45 The LSE
35 David Kynaston, THE CITY OF LONDON, VOL. 1, A WORLD OF ITS OvN 1815-1890, 16-
17 (1994).
36 Michie, supra note 14, at 32.
37 Kynaston, supra note 35, at 18.
38 Michie, supra note 14, at 34-36.
39 1d. at 19.40 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 7&8 Vict, C 110.
41 See, e.g., Cooke, supra note 23.
42 U.K. building societies are similar to savings and loan associations in the U.S. On the
evolution of savings and loan associations, see, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 31, at 253-54.
43 See, e.g., Cooke, supra note 25, at 116-17 (describing the encouragement of friendly
societies under statutes culminating in the Friendly Societies Act of 1829, 10 Geo. IV, c.
56.). Cooke says that "[t]hese societies, friendly, banking and building, all came into statu-
tory existence in the same period, a period before general incorporation laws were seriously
contemplated. They continue to exist today as unincorporated companies, governed largely
by the principles laid down in acts of parliament a century ago, when the trust form was
equipped with some of the trappings of the company in these special fields." Id. at 117.
44 "Building societies began to be set up in the 18th century, and the original ones were
terminating societies, meaning that they were wound up when all the members had suc-
ceeded in their purpose of building or buying a house with the money the society had lent
them." Treasury Select Committee, supra note 16, at 5. After 1874, because they came to
be seen as investment vehicles rather than as existing for social purposes, building societies
could only be formed as incorporated entities under the Building Societies Act, 1874, 37 &3
8 Vict., c. 42 (1874). Cooke, supra note 25, at 118.45 See THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND (H.A.L. Fisher ed.,
1911), Vol. III, 374 ("And so the Stock Exchange was incorporated? Certainly not. In Eng-
land you cannot incorporate people who do not want incorporation, and the members of the
Stock Exchange did not want it. Something had been said about the submission of the "bye-
laws" of the corporation to...the Board of Trade. That was the cloven hoof. Expede diabo-
lur.").
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finally incorporated as a private limited company in 1986.46 The Button-
wood Agreement of 1792 between brokers in New York was an early stage47
in the development of the New York Stock Exchange. The first New
York general incorporation statute was enacted in 1811,4' but the NYSE did
not incorporate until 197 1,49 as a New York not-for-profit corporation? °
The rights of members of mutual firms vary from jurisdiction to juris-
diction, and also depend on the provisions of the mutual's constitutive
documents. Decision-making procedures vary. In the same way that own-
ers and managers of corporations find that their interests may conflict, dis-
putes may arise about the respective rights and duties of management and
members of mutuals51 The major differences between mutual firms and
proprietary firms are in the financial rights of the members, and in the deci-
sion-making procedures that apply within the firms.
III. THE DEMUTUALIZATION MOVEMENT: BUILDING SOCIETIES
AND THRIFTS, INSURANCE COMPANIES AND EXCHANGES
Exchanges are not the only type of mutual business to demutualize in
the last decade. U.K. building societies have demutualized, becoming more
like banks.52 Insurance companies in various parts of the world have also
46 See, e.g. London Stock Exchange, Information Memorandum, 9 (2000) available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/dealinglpdfs/demutualisation.pdf (last visited Mar.
14,2001).47 See, e.g., Banner, supra note 5, at 115 (briefly describing the Buttonwood Agreement).
48 Act of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. LXVII, §1, 1811 N.Y. Laws 111. Other Stock Exchanges
subsequently formed in the U.S. See, e.g., Joseph L. King, HISTORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
STOCK AND EXCHANGE BOARD, 1 (1910) (recording the organization of the exchange in
1862).
49 See http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/historical99.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2001).50 See Certificate of Incorporation of New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 2 NYSE Guide
(CCH) at 1021-1023.
51 In the U.K. recently, the House of Lords interpreted the provisions of the Articles of
Association of the Equitable Life Assurance Society as precluding the directors from adopt-
ing a principle of making the final bonuses of guaranteed annuity rate policyholders depend-
ent on how they exercised their rights under the policy. Equitable Life Assurance Society v.
Hyman [2000) 3 WLR 529. The decision imposed significant costs on the Society, which
announced that it was putting itself up for sale. See, e.g., Personal Investment Authority,
Equitable Life Assurance Society, Regulatory Update (December 2000) available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/consumer/whatsnew/equitableRegUp82.pdf (last visited Feb. 23,
2001). The Halifax, a U.K. bank which was formerly a mutual building society, decided to
acquire the Equitable Life Assurance Society. See Equitable Life Assurance Society Press
Release, Acquisition of the Society's Operations by Halifax Group PLC (Feb 5, 2001) avail-
able at http:llwww.equitable.co.uk/etmarket.nsflweb+pages/CIPRO10205E (last visited Feb.
23, 2001).
52 Building Societies Act, 1986, 1986 Ch. 53. The statute establishes the conditions un-
der which building societies may demutualize. For litigation arising out of the conversion of
building societies from mutual entities, see, e.g., Northern Rock plc v. Thorpe (Inspector of
Taxes) [2000] STC (SCD) 317 (discussing tax treatment of conversion expenses).
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demutualized.53 There are three main arguments for demutualization: sub-
jecting the firm to the discipline of the marketplace; facilitating the raising
of capital; and allowing diversification into areas that would not be appro-.
priate for a mutual enterprise. 4 The arguments exchange managements
make for demutualization are similar to those which managements of insur-
ance companies and other types of mutual firm (or their members) make for
demutualization, but exchanges raise issues which do not arise in the con-
text of other firms.
Demutualization tends to produce a windfall for members of the mu-
tual organization when their interests obtain a market valuation-' Although
members of a building society (savers and borrowers) are not usually con-
sidered to be its owners, when British building societies are demutualized,
borrowers as well as depositors are treated as if they were owners,5 6 and
share in the financial benefits of demutualization: their ownership interests
are recognized and given a market value that can be realized by selling the
shares in the market. Members of many building societies have initiated
campaigns for demutualization in order to produce such windfall gainsi
7
53 See, e.g., James A. Smallenberger, Restructuring Mutual Life Insurance Compa-
nies:a Practical Guide Through the Process, 49 DRAKE L. REv. 513 (2001).
4 See Treasury Select Committee, supra note 16, at 7 (describing reasons for demutu-
alization of building societies).
55 See Treasury Select Committee, supra note 16, at 8 (describing the windfall as "the
current spur to demutualisation").
56 See, e.g. a passage in the Treasury Select Committee's report on demutualization, de-
scribing a lawyer's explanation of ownership rights in a building society. "Mr Malcolm Wa-
ters, QC, a barrister specialising in building society law, told us that 'the lawyer's answer'
was that the assets of a building society are owned by the current members, in that they are
the people who would share in the assets if the society were to be wound up. This is not, of
course, a realistic expectation for most members-very few societies are dissolved. But Mr.
Waters went on to say that it was 'simplistic' to describe a building society as the property of
its present members, as 'in no sense can the holder of a share in a building society be re-
garded as having "bought" a stake in the Society's reserves'. He also pointed out that the
buying of a shareholding in a mutual is different from one in a company, in that its value
does not vary with the success of the business (unless it becomes insolvent) or with the level
of a society's reserves. He concluded that the introduction of the possibility of demutualisa-
tion, rather than being a consequence of the members' ownership rights, is the principal
cause of members coming to believe that they own the society." Treasury Select Committee,
supra note 16, at 25. In sum, the members of the building society have contingent owner-
ship rights. If the society is wound up, or changes its legal form, they are the residual claim-
ants.
57 People who invest small amounts of money in a number of building societies to benefit
from many windfalls are known as "carpetbaggers". See, e.g., Chelsea Building Society
Press Release, Chelsea's Success as a Building Society to Continue, Jan. 31, 2001, available
at http://%vwv.thechelsea.co.ukihtml/news__31jan2001.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2001) (de-
scribing Mr. Naughton-Doe as "the leader of the carpetbaggers"). In 1999, the Lambeth
Building Society announced that it was closing its investment accounts to new investors or
introducing minimum investment amounts of £3000 to stave off carpetbaggers. See Lam-
beth Building Society Press Release, Lambeth Acts to Deter Carpetbaggers (Sept. 9, 1999)
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Incumbent managements of building societies subject to such attacks fight
back by arguing that members will achieve a short term gain at the cost of
higher interest rates and lower savings rates which would apply if the
demutualized entity needed to pay dividends to shareholders. 8 So, one
question about building society demutualization is whether the long-term
interests of the members are being sacrificed because of the lure of short-
term profits.
The battle over the building societies continues to rage. Although a
number of building societies have demutualized, some have decided to re-
tain their mutual status.5 9 In other cases, the management of the building
society has re jected demutualization proposals without putting them to a
member vote. The action of building society managements in fighting off
demutualization proposals has prompted some to argue that the story that
managements of mutual building societies think only of the interests of their
members are untrue.6!
available at http://www.lambeth.co.ukllbpr__990909.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001). See
the list of Useful Web Sites for Carpetbaggers at http://www.carpetbagger.com/links.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2001). The Cairngorm Demutualisation Investment Trust is a vehicle
for investment in mutuals which may demutualize. See
http://www.caimgorm.co.uk/demut/demut.html (last visited Mar. 14,2001).
58 See, e.g., Chelsea Building Society Press Release, Chelsea Re-affirms Commitment to
Remaining Mutual, Dec. 29, 2000, available at
http://www.thechelsea.co.uk/html/news_29dec2000.htnl (last visited Feb. 20, 2001) ("By
not having to pay dividends to equity shareholders, Chelsea can pay more interest to inves-
tors and charge less to borrowers. Conversion to a plc, by whatever route, would rob future
generations of these benefits and remove a significant element of competition from a market
increasingly dominated by profit-driven plc banks."). The Building Societies Association, a
trade association for building societies in the U.K., argues that "Mutual societies have only
the interests of their customers to consider and have no shareholders to whom they need to
pay dividends. Generally, this means that committed mutual building societies can offer
more competitive rates of interest on mortgage and savings products." See
http://www.bsaorg.uk/ (last visited Feb.19, 2001).
59 See, e.g., Building Societies Association Press Release, Victory for Leek United, 3 De-
cember, 1999, available at http://www.bsa.org.uk/PressReleases/pr031299.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2001) Britannia Building Society Press Release, Britannia gives overwhelming vote
for mutuality, April 27, 2000, available at
http://www.britannia.co.uklbritannia/britnews/mutualvote?view=Standard (last visited Feb.
20, 2001).
60 See, e.g., Chelsea Building Society Press Release, supra note 58 (explaining that the
Society had rejected a proposed resolution for demutualization "Following legal advice from
a leading firm of City solicitors and leading counsel').
61 The Building Societies Members Association describes its aim as: "To convert building
societies to the true principles of mutuality - owned by members and run for members - not
for directors." Id. at http://www.building-societies-members.org.uk/02our-aims.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2001). Cf. Swiss Re, supra note 25, at 8 ("The strength of mutuals lies in
their ability to control customer-owner conflict. Mutuals fall short, however, at controlling
owner-manager conflict.").
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Sometimes a firm may adopt a partial demutualization strategy, involv-
ing the transfer of the business of the mutual to a proprietary company. The
mutual company becomes a holding company that does not engage in busi-
ness itself.62
In North America and elsewhere in recent years, many insurance com-
panies have demutualized.63  Just as with building societies in the U.K.,
there is a significant amount of conflict surrounding the issue of demutuali-
zation of insurance companies. Some of the members of the insurance
companies support or encourage demutualization, and sometimes organiza-
tions of members of mutual insurance companies mobilize to achieve de-
mutualization in order to benefit members financially.64 Other groups
oppose demutualization because they do not see the change in structure as
beneficial to members.65 Managements of mutual insurance companies
vary in their views about whether demutualization is the right strategy for
their firm.
66
Similarly, in the last decade a number of exchanges have demutualized
or announced plans to become proprietary entities.67 Exchanges that have
demutualized include the London Stock Exchange,68 the Toronto Stock Ex-
62 See, e.g., Swiss Re, supra note 25, at 27. The conversion to a mutual holding company
strategy is less expensive than a full demutualization. Id. at 28. U.S. Savings and loans insti-
tutions are permitted to form mutual holding companies.63 See, e.g., Swiss Re, supra note 25, at 4 (listing a number of large insurance companies
which have demutualized). The Board of Directors of Prudential approved a demutualization
plan in December, 2000. See Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential")
Press Release, Prudential's Board of Directors Adopts Plan to Convert From Mutual to
Stock Ownership, (Dec. 18, 2000), available at
http://vww.prudential.com/demutualization/dmzzzl001.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2001);
Prudential, A Guide to Demutualization, available at
http://wwv.prudential.comdemutualization/dmzzzl000.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
64 See, e.g., the Massmutual Owners' Association website at
http://xvww.massmutualownersassociation.com/main.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2001) (advo-
cating demutualization of the Mass Mutual and Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Compa-
nies, and describing the campaign as one to "distribute more than $4 Billion to
policyowners"). Massmutual has no plans to demutualize. See About Mass Mutual at
http://wwv.massmutual.comlMMFinanciallIndex/0,4174,MM_ABOUT_MASSMUTUAL,0
0.htm (last visited Feb 22, 2001).65 See, e.g., http://wwwv.demutualization.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2001) ("We think that
the demutualization of life insurers is an executive self-enrichment scheme developed by
management and their corporate law firms.").
6 For example, the management of Mass Mutual does not currently intend to demutual-
ize, whereas Prudential has decided to do so. Compare notes 64 and 63 above.
67 See Demutualization Discussion Paper, supra note 2, at 2 ("At last year's annual meet-
ing of the Federation intemationale des bourses des valeurs ("FIBV"), it was reported infor-
mally that of the 52 exchanges present, 15 had demutualized, 14 had member approval to
demutualize and 15 were actively contemplating demutualization.').
68 LSE Press Release, Exchange Votes to Demutualise (March 15, 2000), available at
http://wwwv.londonstockexchange.com/press/releases/15-03-00.asp (last visited Feb. 19,
2001).
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change, 69 and the Australian Stock Exchange.70 Late in 2000, NASD an-
nounced its decision to spin off the Nasdaq market, retaining only a minor-
ity interest,71 and it completed a private placement in January 2001.72 The
NYSE has also announced its intention to demutualize.
73
Exchanges demutualize for reasons similar to those identified by other
types of mutual firms. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, which demutual-
ized in November 2000, becoming Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc.,74
identified five major objectives for its demutualization: a governance and
69 See Toronto Stock Exchange Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.15, § 13.0.1 (providing that To-
ronto Stock Exchange might apply to be continued under the Business Corporations Act).
See also Toronto Stock Exchange, A Blueprint for Success, 1 (Oct. 8, 1998), available at
http://tsers.com/cgi-bin/uni-framset.cgi?content%3Dpdf/TSEbook.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,
2001) (proposing strategies for improving the exchange's competitive position, including
demutualization). The Boston Consulting Group did the research that led to the Toronto
Stock Exchange's proposal for change in structure in 1998. Id. at 1. The Toronto Stock Ex-
change was established as an unincorporated association, and later incorporated by a statute
of 1878. An Act to Incorporate the Toronto Stock Exchange, Ch. 65, Statutes of Ontario,
1878. Section 6 of the Act notes the existence of an "unincorporated Toronto Stock Ex-
change".70 See, e.g., Australian Stock Exchange, Listing Information Memorandum (Aug. 28,
1998) available at http://www.asx.com.au/shareholder/pdf/InfoMemoranduml.pdf;
http://www.asx.com.aulshareholder/pdf/InfoMemorandum2.pdf: and
http://www.asx.com.au/shareholder/pdf/lnfoMemorandum3.pdf Oast visited Feb.16, 2001).
The exchanges which joined together to form the Australian Stock Exchange dated back to
the 19th century. Australian Stock Exchange, History of the Market, at
http://www.asx.com.au/about/HistoryAA2.shtm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001) ("The ASX
(Australian Stock Exchange Limited) was formed in 1987 by legislation of the Australian
Parliament which enabled the amalgamation of six independent stock exchanges that for-
merly operated in the state capital cities. Each of those exchanges had a history of share trad-
ing dating back to the 19th century.").
" See, e.g., Robert R. Glauber, CEO and President, NASD, Opening Remarks at NASD
Fall Securities Regulation Conference, San Francisco, California (Nov.17, 2000) available at
http://www.nasdr.com/1420/glauber01.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2001) ("As you know, we
are completing the spin-off of the Nasdaq Stock Market - from the NASD into the hands of
private owners. When the second round is completed - likely before the end of the year -
NASD will own only a modest minority position in Nasdaq."). See also Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change Amending the Nasdaq By-laws and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation, SEc. & EXCH. COMM'N, Exchange Act Release No. 34,42983, 65 Fed. Reg.
41116 (Jul. 3, 2000). NASD is strictly, not an exchange, but is regulated as a securities
information processor under Section 1IA of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act), 15 U.S.C. §78k-i (1994). See, e.g., Regulation ATS, supra note 115, at 70,852. Nasdaq
does plan to register as an exchange. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Amending the
Nasdaq By-laws and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, Id.72 Nasdaq Press Release, Nasdaq Completes Private Offering and Expands Board, (Jan.
25, 2001) available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/pr.private.offering_012501.stm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2001).
73 Grasso, supra note 12.
74 See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exchange Press Release, CME Becomes a For-Profit
Corporation (Nov. 13, 2000) available at http://www.cme.com/news/00-149corp.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2001).
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managerial structure that could respond quickly to competition; a financial
decision-making model based on stockholder value; the possibility of
pursuing new business strategies; unlocking members' equity values; and
facilitating working with strategic partners. The Toronto Stock Exchange
said that being a "for-profit" business ... will help the organization to be-
come more competitive, more entrepreneurial, and more cus-
tomer-focused., 76 One of the reasons for the Australian Stock Exchange's
demutualization was that the interests of large and small brokers were di-
verging and it was difficult for the exchange to represent both interest
groups and remain competitive. 77 Richard Grasso, of the NYSE, has ex-
pressed this last concern even more forcefully, arguing that members of the
exchange can only "realize economic value from their right to trade on the
NYSE floor," which "skews the interests of member-owners toward the
value of the floor trading privilege. 78 In addition, the diversity of the inter-
ests of members "is a continual source of tension and conflict. At times it
leads to careful deliberations and consensus judgment. All too often it can
lead to cumbersome decision-making and strategic gridlock."
79
Potential windfalls from demutualization distort incentives. In build-
ing societies where the members could just as easily invest in or borrow
from another financial institution, they have no definitive commitment to
the future of the society, and cannot necessarily be trusted to reach the right
decision about whether the society should become a proprietary company or
not.80 It is not clear whether the same distortion is likely to occur in the
context of exchange conversions. Membership of an exchange is different
from membership in a building society and, although exchange members
may look forward to realizing gains from selling some of their shares in the
demutualized exchange, they may be more likely to be thinking of their
continuing position in relation to the exchange when they vote on a conver-
sion.
Demutualizations of businesses such as insurance companies and ex-
changes are different in another way. One of the concerns about demutuali-
75 CME Registration Statement, supra note 15, at 19-20.
76 Toronto Stock Exchange, Demutualization of the TSE, at
http:/wvw.tse.comltseinc/demutual.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).77 ASX Managing Director, Richard Humphry, ASX in the New Millennium - Operating
in a Globalised Market, Presentation to the Securities Institute of Australia, 9 May, 2000,
available at http:/vww.asx.com.aulshareholder/131SP090500_AS3.shtm (last visited Feb.
21, 2001). This view contrasts with Craig Pirrong's model which suggests that where mem-
bers of an exchange are homogenous, exchanges would be for profit, whereas heterogenous
members would want a non-profit business form. Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Ex-
change Organization, 43 J. LAW & EcoN. 437,438 (2000).
78 Grasso, supra note 12.
79id.
'0 The carpetbaggers illustrate this point. People who invest in a society with a view to
benefiting financially from a demutualization are not likely to vote against the conversion.
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zation of mutual banks and insurance companies is that the proprietary
company will pay less attention to the social functions of the firm in order
to maximize profits." The social functions of exchanges and insurance
companies are different. The activities of insurance companies and banks
have a direct impact on customers who are consumers. Securities ex-
changes provide their services primarily to businesses, rather than to con-
sumers, so, in one sense, the public interest in the exchanges' business form
may be less. On the other hand, there is a public interest in the exchanges
as a central element of the capital raising process.8 2
Clearly, to the extent that firms wish to raise capital, it is easier for
them to do so as proprietary entities than as mutual entities.83 Mutual enti-
ties can look to their members as sources of funds;8 4 proprietary entities can
look to a wider range of potential investors. U.K. building societies have
tended to use demutualization as a means of returning capital to their mem-
bers rather than one of raising capital, but exchanges are technologically in-
tensive businesses, so their needs for capital may be greater. On the other
hand, note that one of the CME's objectives was to unlock members' equity
values.85 The Toronto Stock Exchange sold the idea of demutualization to
its members by suggesting that it would give the members new rights to any
surplus of the exchange and that it would limit their risk of liability. 
6
81 See, e.g., Etienne Pflimlin, Demutualisation of Financial Co-operatives, (October 1999)
available at http://www.coop.org/europe/rareports598.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2001)
("This is of course an economic and financial challenge: choosing between short-term profit-
ability for shareholders only or long-term development for all. But it is also a social and po-
litical choice, or even an ideological and cultural choice - the right to exist and maintain the
co-operative difference - aimed at building a democratic and caring comnunity.').
82 Competition from alternative trading systems may prompt exchanges to become more
competitive, but these systems free ride on the existence of the exchanges. See, e.g., the Re-
port of Grant Samuels on the Sydney Futures Exchange's demutualization proposal. Sydney
Futures Exchange, Proposal to Demutualise Information Memorandum, 177 (June 19, 2000)
available at http://www.sfe.com.au/site/html/shareholder/demut.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2001) ("In fact, while ECNs are often seen as the way forward they could not operate with-
out the underlying exchange structure fulfilling its regulatory role. In effect, they "piggy
back" on it.").83 Nonprofit firms cannot raise capital in the financial markets. See, e.g., Hansmann, su-
pra note 29, at 240 (Nonprofit firms, by definition, are incapable of obtaining equity capi-
tal").
84 See, e.g., Blueprint for Success, supra note 69, at 20 (stating "Contrary to widely held
belief, the legal structure of the Exchange does not vest the seatholders with any residual
ownership interests of the assets of the Exchange; seatholders however, bear unlimited liabil-
ity for discretionary levies by the Exchange.").
85 See text at note 75.
86 Toronto Stock Exchange, Information Circular providing members with information
regarding demutualization of the Toronto Stock Exchange and the market realignment in
Canada, 1 (1999), available at
http://tsers.com/cgi-bin/uni-framset.cgicontent%3Dpdf/infocirc.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,
2001) (The Board believes that members will reap many rewards for their support. Today
TSE seats have a static value unrelated to the TSE's asset base. Members have no right to
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NYMEX stated that, although it would not guarantee a market in the ex-
change's shares, it would be able to pay dividends to stockholders. 87
Another set of reasons for demutualization involves introducing new
governance structures into exchanges: moving from a world of consensus,
based on one vote per member, to a world of voting according to the level
of investment in the enterprise and a model of taking account of the inter-
ests of shareholders in decision-making. The move from a consensus-based
system should increase the ease of decision-making. 8 In addition to chang-
ing procedures for decision-making, demutualization may be a tool for
changing the culture of a firm. 9
There is also a public relations advantage: in a world where traditional
exchanges are being challenged by a range of non-exchange service provid-
ers which compete with the services offered by exchanges, 90 one of the ma-
jor advantages the exchanges derive from demutualization is that they look
less like dinosaurs than mutual exchanges do.9' Exchange managements
portray demutualization as a forward-looking strategy. For example, the
chairman of the New York Mercantile Exchange stated that demutualization
was "indicative of the progressive and innovative manner in which we will
proceed as a for-profit corporation to reposition the Exchange as a 21st cen-
tury business enterprise that will create and pursue profitable new opportu-
nities, react rapidly and decisively in an increasingly competitive
marketplace, and explore interest by outside investors. ' '92
any surplus, while the risk of liability is of increasing concern in the new environment. Fun-
damentally, members have outgrown the need for seats.").
87 See NYMEX Holdings, Inc., Amendment No. I to Form S-4 Registration Statement, 1
(Apr. 14, 2000) available at http://www.nymex.com/news/s4._April.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
200 1). These statements also appeared in the proxy statement and prospectus dated May 12,
2000 available at http://vww.freeedgar.com/
8" See, e.g., Toronto Stock Exchange Information Circular, supra note 86, at 5 ("Since the
Exchange has historically attempted to resolve issues by consensus, the current governance
model is becoming an increasingly low and cumbersome method of making decisions. Ac-
tion is delayed by lengthy consultation, making it difficult for the Exchange to respond
quickly and decisively to changes in the market."). Note that what the TSE is referring to
here is the constraint imposed by the Exchange's norms, rather than by legal rules. The
change in legal form is to be what allows a change in the norms which apply within the ex-
change.
89 See, e.g., Swiss Re, supra note 25, at 23 (At some mutual insurers, managers sense a
need to effect a cultural change within their organizations to promote greater efficiency, cost
cutting, and general market sophistication...Converting to a stock often helps facilitate a
switch to a more efficient mode of operation.").
90 The Toronto Stock Exchange said in 1998 that "volume and liquidity is being drawn
away from traditional stock exchanges." Blueprint for Success, supra note 69, at 4.
91 Cf Swiss Re, supra note 25, at 4 (asking whether mutuals have become an anachro-
nism).92 NYMEX Press Release, Exchange Demutualizes, (Nov. 20, 2000) available at
http://www.nymex.com/news/prdetail.cfm?id=319 (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:657 (2001)
When mutual exchanges convert to proprietary companies, they substi-
tute the need to maximize profits to benefit shareholders 93 for the need to
consider the interests of members. 94  The calculus of decision-making
changes. Rather than running the business with a view to what the mem-
bers may agree to, the management of a proprietary exchange will be man-
aging the business as if it were any other type of business. A rational
management will adopt business strategies that promote the interests of ex-
change shareholders in maximizing the returns on their investment. Man-
agers may be even more likely to do so if they have a financial stake in the
value of the exchange's shares because of share option schemes.95 To the
extent that the demutualized exchange has shareholders who are not partici-
pants in the exchange's market, there may be a divergence between the in-
terests of owners and customers of the exchange. 6 Some argue that
increased competition between financial markets is one reason why market
participants no longer need mutual exchanges.97 Competition between
markets should also encourage proprietary exchanges to consider the inter-
ests of market participants as part of their profit maximizing strategies.
These advantages may be realized, but at a cost. If nothing else, there
is an immediate financial cost to the enterprise, and its owners, as demutu-
alization is not cheap. Prudential reported demutualization expenses of
93 Ruben Lee suggests that for-profit exchanges define their objectives in wider terms
than mere profit maximization, and that "[t]he assumption that the maximization of profits is
the prime, let alone the sole goal of such exchanges is therefore open to question." Ruben
Lee, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE?, 24 (1998).
94 See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 31, at 62 ("Investor-owned firms have the important
advantage that their owners generally share a single well-defined objective: to maximize the
net present value of the firm's earnings. The costs of collective decision making are thus
relatively low for investor-owned firms.").
95 Grant Samuel's report on the Sydney Futures exchange's demutualization proposal
identifies "an ability to incentivise management appropriately" as an advantage of demutu-
alization. SFE, Information Memorandum, supra note 82, at 162. The London Stock Ex-
change introduced such a scheme as part of its demutualization. LSE Information
Memorandum, supra note 46, at 26-27. The Share scheme was "designed to develop quickly
a stronger commercial culture within the Exchange and to align closely senior management's
interests and actions with the interests of the Ordinary Shareholders." Id. at 26. NYMEX
suggested its ability to "retain and attract professional management" would be improved if it
could implement "stock-based incentive plans." NYMEX Registration Statement, supra note
87, at 8.
96 The Sydney Futures Exchange recognized that demutualization might disadvantage
members because the exchange would focus on maximizing shareholder value. SFE, Infor-
mation Memorandum, supra note 82, at xvii, 21.97 See, e.g., SFE, Information memorandum, supra note 82, at 12 ("Mutual organisations
were set up for a variety of reasons, including to provide purchasers of a product or users of
a service with additional protection against the exercise of market power... Today, the impor-
tance to the participants in the market of retaining mutual ownership of an exchange is re-
duced. As previously discussed, electronic trading systems make it much easier for
alternative providers, or even the market participants themselves, to offer competitive prod-
ucts and services, limiting any potential market power."
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$113 million in the nine months leading up to the end of September 2000,
before the completion of its demutualization.98  The Sydney Futures Ex-
change stated that it would spend Aus$4.8 million on its plan, whether or
not it demutualized.99 Furthermore, there may be other costs in terms of
how the market values shares in the firm after conversion, and in terms of
the increased vulnerability of the firm to hostile takeover attempts. Finan-
cial regulators may incur additional costs in monitoring the conflicts of in-
terest that may arise in proprietary exchanges.
IV. EXCHANGES AS PROPRIETARY BUSINESSES
In order to begin to think about the implications of exchanges being
proprietary businesses, rather than mutual enterprises, it is helpful to think
about the business of exchanges. Exchanges' business is different from that
of firms engaged in other businesses. Exchanges sell listings for financial
instruments that satisfy their requirements. 100 They also provide facilities
whereby people can trade in financial instruments. ' ' They sell information
about the prices at which financial instruments trade.'02 They sell regula-
tion of their members. The exchanges do not sell the financial instruments
themselves, but merely allow market participants to buy and sell the in-
struments. Successful exchanges attract trades in securities because of the
depth0 3 and liquidity of the markets. 1°4 Depth and liquidity are a function
98 See Prudential, Third Quarter 2000 Fast Facts, available at
http://media.corporate-ir.nettmedia-files/PRIV/10693/reports/fastfacts-december00.pdf (last
visited Feb 22, 2001).
99 SFE, Information Memorandum, supra note 81, at xv. ("SFE will incur an estimated
$4.8 million in costs associated with the development of the Proposal, whether or not the
Proposal proceeds. If the Proposal does proceed, SFE will incur additional costs of approxi-
mately S534,000 in connection with the development of the Proposal.").
100 In the year ending March 31, 1999, 16% of the London Stock Exchange's turnover
from continuing activities (excluding regulatory activities) was from company services (fees
for admission to trading and annual fees). LSE Information Memorandum, supra note 46, at
12.
1o1 In the year ending March 31, 1999, 27% of the London Stock Exchange's turnover
from continuing activities (excluding regulatory activities) was from trading services. LSE
Information Memorandum, supra note 46, at 13.
102 The sale of information may contribute substantially to the exchange's earnings. In the
year ending March 31, 1999, 49% of the London Stock Exchange's turnover from continu-
ing activities (excluding regulatory activities) was from information services. LSE Informa-
tion Memorandum, supra note 46, at 14.
103 See Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Coopera-
tives Versus Outside Ownership, 12 OxFoRD REv. OF ECON. POLICY 53, 55 (1996) ("Perhaps
above all, the key asset of an exchange is market depth: the fact that traders know that they
can deal with many others at the exchange (i.e. there is an agglomeration effect.)").
104 For a suggestion that liquidity is "one dominant vector along which exchanges com-
pete", see Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Globalization, Exchange Governance and
the Future of Exchanges, in Robert E Litan & Anthony M. Santomero (Eds.) BROOKINGS
WHARTON: PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: 1999 (1999), 1-23, at 2. See also Humphry, su-
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of the number of participants who are attracted to a particular market to
trade there, and part of what attracts market participants is likely to be con-
fidence in the trading arrangements in that market. Exchanges, therefore,
are in the business of selling services that are partly constituted by rules
they develop themselves.0 5
Don Cruickshank, chairman of the LSE, described the LSE's "three
main revenue and profit-generating activities" as "broker services; issuer
services; information services; supported by two core business areas of
market supervision and systems plus the usual central services."'1 6 Jona-
than Macey and Maureen O'Hara suggest that the "business of operating an
exchange has changed from being a relationship business to being a com-
modity business.' 0  But an established exchange with deep, liquid markets
has a competitive advantage over newly created markets, not so much be-
cause of relationships, but because large numbers of people are in the habit
of trading through its facilities.
In contrast to exchanges, stores are commonly the vendors of the prod-
ucts and services they sell, rather than facilitators. Moreover, stores have a
limited ability to set the rules according to which transactions are accom-
plished within their premises. Exchanges are much more like auction
houses, or dating services, than they are like stores. Auction houses are
proprietary businesses that provide facilities for people to buy and sell
products according to the rules established by the auction house. Typically,
the number of transactions that pass through an auction house has been
much smaller than the number of transactions on an exchange (although the
dollar value of some individual auction house transactions may be enor-
mous). Online auctions can produce large numbers of completed transac-
tions. 1' The Internet has given birth to numerous business-to-business
pra note 77 ("If there is one task that I have got, it is to try and preserve Australia's capital
markets ... to make them deeper and larger and more liquid, to have the liquidity which will
attract investors into the market and make our companies want to stay here and not to move
into other markets."; New York Stock Exchange Special Committee on Market Structure,
Governance and Ownership, Market Structure Report, 16 (2000) available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/marketstructure.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2001) ("A securities
market that does not attract liquidity cannot deliver accurate price discovery or best order
executions.").
105 See, e.g., LSE, Rules & Regulatory Guidance. Overview of Our Regulatory Role, at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/regulation/regulation.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2001)
("The attractiveness of the Exchange's markets is maintained by providing an efficient and
well regulated market place.").
106 Don Cruickshank, Speech to the Securities Institute, Oct. 25, 2000, available at
http:/www.londonstockexchange.comlpress/releases/25-10-OO.asp (last visited Feb. 19,
2001).
107 Macey & O'Hara, supra note 104, at 2.
108 Online auctions set their own rules for transactions. For example, e-bid, a U.K.-based
site states: "Our site acts as the venue for sellers to conduct auctions and for bidders to bid
on sellers' auctions. We are not involved in the actual transaction between buyers and sellers.
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("B2B") websites that are geared to facilitating transactions between busi-
nesspeople. Although B2B websites may involve issues, particularly of an-
titrust law, regulators have focused on the risks of electronic commerce for
consumers.1
0 9
The analogies of stores, auction houses, and B2B websites" ° suggest
that there is nothing inherent in the idea of a market that requires that it
should not be a proprietary business. People do own markets."' These
analogies suggest that the legal rules that should regulate exchanges should
be rules to enhance competition, and rules to prevent fraud. People who
own markets should not be able to use them to make monopoly profits or to
defraud their customers.
Interestingly, however, the legal rules that regulate exchanges do not
seem to reflect a close analogy with auction houses. Unlike auction houses,
financial exchanges are subject to their own particular regulatory scheme,
which includes rules designed to prevent fraud and market manipulation,
and they exist in a context of significant regulation of disclosure by issuers
of securities and others. Financial exchanges may be protected from the
operation of antitrust laws,' 12 although the SEC is required to ensure
competition between exchanges and between exchanges and non-exchange
As a result, we have no control over the quality, safety or legality of the items advertised, the
truth or accuracy of the listings, the ability of sellers to sell items or the ability of buyers to
buy items. We cannot and do not control whether or not sellers will complete the sale of
items they offer or buyers will complete the purchases of items they have bid on. In addition,
note that there are risks of dealing with foreign nationals, underage persons or people acting
under false pretence." See http://dev.ebid.co.uk/cgi-bin/objects/normal.cgi?mo=register-main
(last visited Feb. 14, 2001). FED. TRADE. COMM'N, Internet Auctions. A Guide for Buyers
and Sellers, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/onlinefauctions.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 14, 2001). FED. TRADE COMM'N, Going, Going, Gone. Enforcement Efforts to
Combat Internet Auction Fraud, (Feb. 2000) available at
http:llvwvv.ftc.gov/bcp/reports/int-auction.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
109 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMm'N, Consumer Protection in the Global Electronic Mar-
ketplace. Looking Ahead, (Sept. 2000) available at
http:/lwwwv.ftc.govlbep/icpwllooldngahead/electronicmkpl.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2001);
OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Guidelines for Consumer Pro-
tection in the Context of Electronic Commerce, available at
http://vww.ftc.gov/opa!1999/9912oeedguide.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
110For example, Yet2.com is a marketplace for licensable technologies. See
http://vww.yet2.com (last visited Feb. 14,2001).
11 LVMH owns Phillips, de Pury & Luxembourg. Phillips was founded in 1796. See
http://vww.phillips-auctions.com/usa/phintro/intro.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
1 2 See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 688-91 (1975) (holding
that the antitrust laws are deemed repealed to the extent necessary to permit the securities
laws to function as intended by Congress). Cf Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter &
Co. 80 Cal. App. 4th 345, 352 (2000), cert. denied 148 L. Ed. 2d. 781 (2001) (holding fed-
eral securities laws did not pre-empt California's unfair competition law).
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petition between exchanges and between exchanges and non-exchange
markets for securities!1
13
The differences between the legal treatment of financial exchanges and
other markets may be explained by the economic significance of the finan-
cial markets.
In the U.S., securities trading systems are regulated either as securities
exchanges,1 14 or as broker-dealers1 5 subject to the requirements of Regula-
tion ATS. 16 Before the SEC registers a national securities exchange it must
be satisfied that the exchange is capable of enforcing compliance by its
members with the securities laws, that the rules of the exchange provide for
fair access to the exchange, fair representation of members of the exchange,
and fair disciplinary procedures. 1 ' The exchange's rules should not impose
unnecessary or inappropriate burdens on competition,1 8 and they should be:
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, proc-
essing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securi-
ties, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect in-
vestors and the public interest; and are not designed to permit unfair dis-
crimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, or to regulate
113 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11A(a)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C) requires
the SEC "to assure ... (f)air competition among ... exchange markets and markets other than
exchange markets."
114 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines an "exchange" as "any organization, as-
sociation, or group of persons ... which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or
facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise perform-
ing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that
term is generally understood." Section 6 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f. 15 U.S.C § 78
(c)(a)(l). See also Regulation 3b-16, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (April 2000), which defines an
exchange to cover "any organization, association, or group of persons that: (1) brings to-
gether the orders of multiple buyers and sellers; and (2) uses established, non-discretionary
methods (whether by providing a trading facility or by setting rules) under which such orders
interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders agree to the terms of
a trade."
115 Broker-dealers are required to register with the SEC under Section 15(a) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a). See also 17 CFR § 240.301(b)(1) ("The alternative trading system
shall register as a broker-dealer under section 15 of the Act.").
116 Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No.
34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844 (Dec. 22, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242,
249) (providing that securities markets could choose to be regulated as exchanges, or as bro-
ker-dealers subject to alternative trading system rules, including new rules to promote price
transparency), corrected by 64 Fed. Reg. 13,065 (1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 19,450 (1999) (making
technical amendments to final rule) [hereinafter Regulation ATS].
117 15 U.S.C. §78f.
"18 15 U.S.C. §78f(b)(8).
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by virtue of any authority conferred by this chapter matters not related to
the purposes of this chapter or the administration of the exchange.'" 9
In addition to its powers to decide whether or not to register an ex-
change, the SEC also has the power to approve or disapprove proposed ex-
change rule changes.120 At the beginning of 2001, the SEC proposed to
amend the rules for SRO filing of proposed rule changes with the SEC to
allow the SROs to compete more freely with their non-SRO competitors. 2 1
The proposal would permit exchanges to alter the majority of their trading
rules without waiting for SEC approval.1 22 The SEC states that the pro-
posed rule change would not apply to "fundamental issues of market struc-
ture and fairness to customers, members, and non-members, including
potentially anti-competitive or discriminatory conduct on the part of the
SRO's market.'
' 23
Under Regulation ATS, non-exchange securities markets are required
to comply with rules that vary according to their trading volume. 2 4 A mar-
ket with less than five percent of the trading volume in all securities it
trades must file a notice of operation and quarterly reports with the SEC,
must maintain records, including an audit trail of transactions; and must not
use words such as "exchange," or "stock market," in its name.1 25 An ATS
,9 15 U.S.C. §78f(b)(5).
120 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b).
121 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Proposed Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 34, 43860, 66 Fed. Reg. 8912 (Feb. 5, 2001) ("Enhancing the
SROs' ability to implement and to respond quickly to changes in the marketplace should en-
courage innovation and better services to investors, such as further automating the execution
of trades. Investors should also benefit from a competitive environment in which SROs may
easily adapt their trading rules to respond to market opportunities.").
12 Id. at 8914. This would not apply to "a trading rule that would make fundamental
structural changes to the market, and that would significantly affect the protection of inves-
tors or the public interest or impose a significant burden on competition". Id.
'23Id. at 8916.
124 See Regulation ATS, supra note 116, at 70847-8; 17 C.F.R. § 242.301. An exchange
with a low level of trading volume may be exempted from the requirement under §5 of the
1934 Act to register as a national securities market. The Arizona Stock Exchange operates
under a limited volume exemption. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28899 (Feb.
20, 1991), 56 Fed. Reg. 8377 (Feb. 28, 1991). Tradepoint also benefits from such an exemp-
tion. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Tradepoint Financial Networks plc; Order Granting Lim-
ited Volume Exemption from Registration as an Exchange Under Section 5 of the Securities
Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release No. 34, 41199, 64 Fed. Reg. 14953 (Mar. 29, 1999).
As of February 5, 2001,Tradepoint has changed its name to virt-x PLC. See
http://wwv.tradepoint.co.uk/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2001). Virt-x plc is the result of a merger
between SWX Swiss stock Exchange and Tradepoint. See, e.g., Tradepoint Press Release,
Tradepoint signs agreements with SWX Swiss Stock Exchange and Tradepoint Consortium
relating to the creation of the virt-x market for pan-European blue chip stocks (Oct. 23,
2000).
125 See Regulation ATS, supra note 116, at 70847; 17 C.F.R. § 240.301(b) (April 2000).
17 C.F.R. § 240.301(b)(1 1) provides: "The alternative trading system shall not use in its
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with five percent or more of the trading volume in any national market sys-
tem security that registers as a broker-dealer must "integrate its activities
into the national market system".126 Such a system must be linked with a
registered market and must feed the best priced orders in national market
system securities displayed in their systems (including institutional orders)
into the public quote stream, and they must comply with the rules governing
execution priorities and other obligations that apply in the registered market
to which they are linked. 127 An ATS with twenty percent or more of the
trading volume in any single security must grant or deny access based on
objective standards applied in a non-discriminatory manner; and it must es-
tablish procedures to ensure adequate systems capacity, integrity, and con-
tingency planning.1 28 The SEC also announced in 1998 that it intended to
work with the SROs on the development of ongoing, real-time surveillance
for market manipulation and fraud and surveillance procedures specifically
targeted to ATSs.
129
The 1934 Act's model of the regulation of exchanges involves those
exchanges acting as operators and regulators of their markets, subject to the
supervision of the SEC. Securities markets regulated as ATSs do not have
a regulatory function. The SEC has decided that exchange markets may be
proprietary businesses, 130 and that existing exchanges may demutualize.
13 1
This decision by the SEC increases the scope for competition132 between
name the word "exchange," or derivations of the word "exchange," such as the term "stock
market."
12 6 See Regulation ATS, supra note 116, at 70847.
127 See Regulation ATS, supra note 116, at 70847; 17 C.F.R. § 240.310(b)(3) (April,
2000).
12 8 See Regulation ATS, supra note 116, at 70848; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.310(b)(5)-(6) (April,
2000).
12 9 See Regulation ATS, supra note 116, at 70848.
130 See Regulation ATS, supra note 116, at 70848. Tradepoint, a U.K. based exchange
which also operates within the U.S., was founded as a proprietary company. On Tradepoint,
see Elizabeth M. McCarroll, Regulation of Electronic Communications Networks: An Ex-
amination of Tradepoint Financial Network's SEC Approval to Become the First
Non-American Exchange to Operate in the United States, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 211 (2000).
131 See Regulation ATS, supra note 116, at 70848.
132 SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, The National Market System: A Vision That Endures,
speech at Stanford University, Stanford, California, (Jan. 8, 2001) available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speecheslspch453.htm ("In these fiercely competitive times, when
the survival of time-honored institutions is in question, when the viability of business models
is up for debate, when careers and fortunes hang in the balance, crafting markets that serve
the public interest presents an even greater challenge. Market participants threatened by
change may seek refuge in reform they believe will simply buy them time. And market re-
formists likewise may advocate changes artfully crafted to suit their unique business inter-
ests. Prudence is critical as we consider changes to a market system that must never cease to
function, day in and day out, for the benefit of America's investors - not for any one institu-
tion or interest. And that prudence extends to the Commission's role. The SEC's objective or
function is not to dictate a particular market model, but rather, to allow the natural interplay
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traditional exchange markets and newer markets that may wish to acquire
exchange status. 
1 33
Futures exchanges are currently regulated by the CFTC,13 4 which has
recently adopted new rules for its oversight of futures markets, 135 covering
three categories of market: exempt markets, designated contract markets
and registered derivatives transaction execution facilities. 136 In proposing
the new rules, the CFTC stated that the "proposed rules implement statutory
changes that profoundly alter federal regulation of commodity futures and
option markets.' 37 The CFTC has the power to decide whether a contract
market meets the criteria for designation, 138 whether a derivatives transac-
tion execution facility meets the criteria for registration,1 39 or whether a
market is an exempt market.1 40 The statute allows the CFTC to make rules
about these matters, but also establishes criteria. For example, the CFTC
should only designate markets that have rules in place to prevent market
manipulation, and to ensure fair and equitable trading.14  The market
should also provide for the financial integrity of transactions, and should
have disciplinary procedures to ensure compliance with the statute.142 It
should provide the public with access to its rules, regulations, and contract
specifications. 43 The criteria, therefore, resemble those that apply to secu-
rities exchanges. As the SEC proposes to relax its approach to SRO rule
of market forces to shape markets according to the demands of investors. Put another way,
the Commission has been charged by Congress to facilitate the development of a National
Market System. And this begins by proiding the catalyst for market infrastructure refine-
ments that serve the investing public.").
133 For example, "Island", an ECN, has announced plans to register with the SEC as an
exchange. See Press Release, The Island ECN, Inc., Island Takes First Steps Toward Be-
coming Registered Stock Exchange (April 30 1999)
http://www.isld.com/pressroom/releases/043099.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2001).
134 The CFTC derives its powers from the Commodities Exchange Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C.
§ I et seq., as amended by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-554, 114Stat. 2763 (2000) (CFMA 2000).
131 COMM. Fur. TRADING COMM'N, A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities,
Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 42256 (Aug. 10, 2001) (hereinafter
"New Regulatory Framework"). For the CFTC's proposal which led to the new rules, see
Comm. Fur. TRADING COMM'N, A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities, In-
termediaries and Clearing Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 14262 (Mar. 9, 2001).
136 New Regulatory Framework, supra note 135, at 42256
137 Id.
1387 U.S.C § 7, §7a, as amended by CFMA 2000, §110.
139 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, supra note 134, amended the
CEA to introduce derivatives transaction execution facilities. CFMA 2000, § 111.
140 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)allows for the exemption of agreements, contracts, or transactions,
"[i]n order to promote responsible economic or financial innovation and fair competition".
"' CFMA § 110, amending 7 U.S.C. § 7.
142 Id.143 id.
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changes, so the CFTC proposes to adopt a relaxed approach to requiring no-
tification of changes to contract market rules.'
44
Meanwhile, Europeans are engaged in a discussion of how to achieve a
single European market in financial services, 145 which includes discussions
of the appropriate regulation of exchanges and alternative trading sys-
tems. 46 At the international level, an IOSCO working group has suggested
what a supervisory framework for the regulation of securities markets
should look like.147 The framework reflects the approach of securities regu-
lators in different jurisdictions to the regulation of the securities markets. 148
An appendix to the document provides "some examples' ' 149 of regulation in
a number of different jurisdictions: Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S.'5° The frame-
work includes rules to ensure an orderly market,'5 ' and to promote transpar-
144 Proposal for a New Regulatory Framework, supra note 135, at 14263 ("In light of the
past successful conduct of its oversight duties without the submission of every rule change,
the Commission believes that it is in the public interest to exempt contract markets from the
requirement that they certify all rules. The Commission also believes that this additional
flexibility is consistent with the overall intent and structure of the recent amendments to the
Act.").
145 See, e.g., EU Commission, Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action,
(1998) available at
http://www.europa.eu.intcomm/intemalmarket/en/finances/general/fsen.pdf (last visited
Feb. 27, 2001 ) ("A single deep and liquid financial market which can serve as the motor for
growth, job-creation, and improved competitiveness of the European economy is within
reach.") This discussion is not new. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, 1992: The Case of Finan-
cial Services, 12 N. W. J. INT''L L. & Bus 124 (1991).
146 See, e.g., EU Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Fi-
nancial Markets: Action Plan, 6 (May 1999) available at
http://www.europa'eu.intcomn/intemal-market/en/finances/general/actionen.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 27, 2001) (noting the need for a common European approach to the regulation and
supervision of alternative trading systems).
147 Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8.
148 See Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8, at I ("The Technical Commit-
tee Working Group on the Regulation of Secondary Markets..was given the mandate to sur-
vey the methods and scope of members' supervision of regulated markets in order to share
information on regulators' experiences.").
149 Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8, at 14. It is not clear to what extent
the members of the Working Groups relied on other examples, or other jurisdictions, in
drafting the report.
'so Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8, at Appendix A.
151 Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8, at 3-4. Such rules include trading
rules; default procedures, such as procedures for trading halts; and rules to ensure operator
and systems competence. In addition a regulator should oversee the market operator and
have a role in review of products to be traded. Access to the system should be fair and objec-
tive, and the regulator should supervise admission criteria and procedures. Id.
Demutualization of Financial Exchanges
21:657 (2001)
ency, 52 and rules to prohibit unfair trading.153 In addition, the report sug-
gests that regulation should seek to secure appropriate risk identification
and management, 54 and to ensure that clearing and settlement systems are
effective. .
We know that, in practice, exchanges do not always operate in accor-
dance with the various criteria of IOSCO's framework, so, assuming the
IOSCO criteria are the right ones to apply to securities markets, l5 6 there are
some questions about the effectiveness of regulation of exchanges. Some
of these questions involve problems of enforcement. Insiders engage in in-
sider trading. People manipulate the securities markets. Other questions
involve the substantive content of an exchange's rules. The NYSE's Market
Structure Report pointed out that exchange markets other than the NYSE
effectively allowed broker-dealers to internalize trades, which might not
produce the best price for their customers. 5" If demutualization of ex-
changes were to increase the likelihood that exchanges would operate in ac-
cordance with IOSCO's framework, that would be a good outcome. 158 In
theory, there are some reasons to believe that this might be the case. On the
other hand, there are also reasons for doubt.
In addition to being subject to regulation, proprietary exchanges will,
arguably, be subjected to the discipline of a number of different markets,
152 Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8, at 4. Transparency includes disclo-
sure of information about issuers, securities, trading halts, bid and offer prices, completed
transactions, and order routing and execution procedures. Id.
153 Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8, at 4-5. Such rules would prevent
deceptive and fraudulent conduct such as market manipulation, misleading conduct, and in-
sider trading; they would control conflicts of interest, sales practices, access criteria, and the
conduct of market participants. Id.
154 Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8, at 5-6. Risk management includes
issues of operator competence, capital adequacy of market participants, margin require-
ments, large exposures, and cross-market conduct (involving cash and derivative markets).
Id.
155 Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8, at 6.
156 The criteria are expressed at a level of such generality - they tend to specify the sub-
ject-matter of the rules which should apply to securities markets, rather than their content -
that it is difficult to disagree with them.
157 Market Structure report, supra note 104, at 10-11 ("One presenter stated that his firm
directed its order flow to a regional exchange rather than the NYSE because it could trade
those orders with an affiliated specialist at that exchange. In urging us to facilitate internali-
zation by NYSE member firms, the presenter said that '[t]he ability to internalize is directly
linked to our ability to bring our business back to the [NYSE]."'
158 Paul Mahoney argues that competition between stock exchanges is likely to produce
better rules than those which would be produced by government regulation. See Mahoney,
supra note 6, at 1463 (although "stock exchanges may lack the incentive to adopt optimal
rules" this does "not necessarily provide a strong basis for substituting government agencies
for exchanges as the principal regulators").
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which should increase their efficiency. 5 9 The managements of proprietary
exchanges should have an incentive to maximize revenues and minimize
costs, 169 because their managements have a legal obligation to maximize
profits for owners,' 6' and because the owners will expect them to do so. If
an exchange needs to go to the market to raise new capital its cost of capital
will depend on the attractiveness of its securities to investors.162 If the own-
ers of a proprietary exchange are dissatisfied with its performance they may
sell their shares, depressing the share price, and providing an opportunity
for a predator to move in to acquire the exchange and fire the incumbent
management.1
63
But the discipline imposed on the managements of proprietary ex-
changes by their need to maximize profits may harm the interests of the ex-
changes' customers. Where exchanges need to maximize profits from
attracting listings and trades, their rules may either benefit the managements
of issuers, or encourage trading. If managements of issuers of securities
have the power to decide where the issuer's securities should be listed (or
re-listed) they may decide to list with the exchange with the rules that give
them the most leeway.' 64 Thus rules that would benefit shareholders in the
exchange might harm the interests of shareholders of other issuers listed on
the exchange. Exchange rules that encourage speculative stock trading may
159 Incentives should be different given different ownership structures. See, e.g., Phillip
A. Wellons, Prototypes of Securities Regulation for Africa: Key Issues, Consulting Assis-
tance on Economic Reform 11 Discussion Paper No. 47, August 1999, available at
http://www.hiid.harvard.edu/caer2/htm/contentlpapers/paper47/paper47.htrn#-Toc48216755
6.
160 Schleifer, supra note 19, at 140 (noting that non-profits may avoid problems of quality
reducing cost reduction which may occur in profit maximizing firms, and that the non-profit
structure may, therefore, be appropriate for hospitals, schools, and day care centers.).
161 See, e.g., Dodge v Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (S. Ct. Mich. 1919) (stating
that a "business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stock-
holders").
162 For example, junk bond issuers paid very high rates of interest on their bonds to com-
pensate for the risks associated with the investments. See, e.g., Michael D. Floyd, Junk
Bonds: Do They Have a Value? 35 Emory L.J. 921,924 (1986) ("Junk bonds appeal to a cer-
tain segment of the investment community because they have historically provided higher
returns than less risky alternatives. ')
163 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Cor-
porate Law, 112 (1991)("Corporate control transactions can reduce agency costs if better
managers obtain control of the firm's assets or if they alter the incentive structure facing ex-
isting managers. This means, in turn, greater wealth for all. The gains from control transa-
tions may be exceedingly great.").
164 Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-based Securities Regulation, 83
VA. L REv. 1509, 1511-1512 (1997) (suggesting stock exchanges may adopt rules which
benefit the managers of corporate issuers who make the listing/relisting decision, rather than
investors).
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benefit exchange members but reduce collective investor welfare. 165 The
maximization of profits for the benefit of the shareholders of the exchange
may therefore be inconsistent with the interests of investors in issuers
whose securities list on, or trade through, the exchange. From the perspec-
tive of investors in general, profit maximization may not, therefore, be a
substitute for regulatory control of the exchange.
Within proprietary exchanges, conflicts may arise between the interests
of owners and those of managers, just as they may do in any proprietary
business. This means that proprietary exchanges have the same need for
good corporate governance as do ordinary businesses, in addition to being
subject to the constraints imposed by market mechanisms and legal rules.
However, there are reasons to doubt the effectiveness of corporate govern-
ance measures as protections for the interests of shareholders, even in more
ordinary businesses. 166 For example, some commentators focus on execu-
tive pay that increases even at times when returns to shareholders de-
crease. 67 But even if corporate governance measures do work to protect
the interests of shareholders, they are not designed to protect non-
shareholder interests.168
V. ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRADING IN EXCHANGE SHARES
Exchanges choose different procedures for demutualizing, and differ-
ent arrangements for owners of shares to trade those shares after demutuali-
zation. If an exchange wishes to reach a large and diverse investor group, it
will want to ensure a public market in its shares. However, in practice, ex-
changes seem to move slowly towards this goal. The Toronto Stock Ex-
change's plan for demutualization involved issuing 20 common shares to
each seat-holder.'6 9 The initial plan did not envisage any rapid develop-
ment of a trading market in the exchange's shares, as restrictions on transfer
161 Id. at 1513 (citing Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement,
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 656-91 (1995)). This prob-
lem is probably more likely to arise in mutual stock exchanges than in proprietary ex-
.changes.
166 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regu-
latory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C.L. REV. 1861, 1862 (1995) (describ-
ing corporate law as "a self-regulatory system, composed of firms and state lawmaking
institutions, in which competition among the states ensures the system's capture by corporate
management influence.").
167 See, e.g., Graef Crystal, GE CEO Welch's Pay Shows Capitalism's Ugly Side (Mar.
16, 2001), available at http://wwx.bloomberg.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2001) (noting that
Jack Welch of General Electric received an 80% increase in remuneration while total share-
holder return fell by 6%.).
168 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Owi'mNsm AND CONTROL, 13 (1995) ("the suspicion that
shareholder interests may, at times, be at odds with important social goals lurks behind some
of the more heated corporate governance debates.").
169 See Toronto Stock Exchange Information Circular, supra note 86, at 7.
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would apply for a period of two years.170 Similarly, the London Stock Ex-
change stated that "an interim period is required whilst the Exchange's
business evolves and the consequences and benefits of these changes have
time to take full effect."171 This was one reason for the initial decision not
to list the exchange's shares. 7 2 Other exchanges have initiated IPOs to
make their foray into the market. The NYSE's plan is to separate members'
rights into a trading right and shares of stock and to "structure the IPO to
create incentives so that a percentage of their shares are sold to non-member
institutions and public investors." 1 Nasdaq's plan involved a two-stage
private placement of common stock and warrants to NASD members,
Nasdaq issuers, institutional investors and strategic partners.174 The Sydney
Futures Exchange stated, as part of its proposal to demutualize in June,
2000, that it did not plan to list shares immediately, although it would be
preferable to list its shares in due course.175 The SFE arranged for its shares
to be traded on an exempt market operated by Austock from the beginning
of November 2000.176
Trading arrangements vary. Shares in the Australian Stock Exchange
are listed on the exchange itself.177 London Stock Exchange shares are
traded on the exchange's main market.178 Shares of the holding company of
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Lim-
ited, are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.17 9 Shares in Tradepoint
170 See id. at 9.
171 LSE Information Memorandum, supra note 46, at 8.
172 Id. Another reason was that the Exchange had no immediate need for capital. Id.
173 See Grasso, supra note 12.
174 Order approving Proposed Rule Change Amending the Nasdaq By-laws and Restated
Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 69.
17 SFE, Information Memorandum, supra note 82, at vii, 38.
'
76 See, Sydney Futures Exchange Press Release, SEE Shares to List on Austock Market,
(Oct. 23, 2000), available at
http://www.sfe.com.au/content/media/mediarelease/2000/mr_2000102301.htm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2001). See also SFE Disclosure Document, Austock Exempt Market Listing (up-
dated Jan. 10, 2001) available at
http://www.sfe.com.au/site/html/shareholder/austockdisclosure.pdf (last visited Mar. 14,
2001).
177 "ASX was originally a mutual organisation of stockbrokers, like its predecessor State
stock exchanges. However, in 1996, its members decided to demutualise and list, which re-
quired legislation of the Australian parliament. The change of status took place on October
13, 1998, and the following day ASX listed on its market." ASX Overview and Structure, at
http://www.asx.com.au/shareholder/3/ASXOverview_AS3.shtm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
"7 See London Stock Exchange, Introduction to the Official List Sponsored by
Schroder Salomon Smith Barney for Listing in July 2001, available at
http:llwww.londonstockexchange.com/dealing/pdfs/c82754CL.pdf (last visited Oct. 1,
2001).
179 Memorandum of Understanding for the Listing of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clear-
ing Limited on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited Between Securities and Futures
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are traded on the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market
("AIM"). 80 The CME stated in April 2000 that it had no current plans to
list its shares on an exchange.1 8' Euronext stated in August 2000 that it
planned to list its shares on Euronext. 
82
No solution to the problem of how to create a market in the exchange's
shares is perfect. If the shares are not listed on any exchange, the market in
the shares is likely to be thinner and less liquid than if the shares were
listed. Some investors who might be interested in holding the exchange's
shares will not invest if the shares are not listed. If the demutualization plan
is primarily geared to improving the exchange's governance, and if the
shareholders do not mind that the market for their shares is relatively illiq-
uid, this may not matter. The London Stock Exchange chose not to list its
shares on demutualization, although its Chairman has suggested that the
Exchange may list its shares in the future.
18 3
If the exchange does plan to list its shares to maximize the attractive-
ness of the shares to outside investors and to obtain as liquid a market for
those shares as possible, it will need to decide where to list the shares. If
the exchange decides to list its shares on a competitor exchange, this may
suggest a lack of self-confidence. On the other hand, for an exchange to list
its own shares looks strange, 18 4 and raises the specter of conflicts of interest.
It is doubtful whether an entity responsible for evaluating compliance with
initial and continuing listing requirements can legitimately apply those re-
quirements to itself.
Commission, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, and the Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong Limited, 19th June 2000. Documents available from Hong Kong Stock Exchange web-
site available at http://vww.hkex.com.hk/relation/relation.htm (visited 29 January, 2001).
Shares in OM Gruppen, the holding company of the Stockholm Stock Exchange, are traded
on the SSE. See, e.g., Blueprint for Success, supra note 68, at 12 ("OM Gruppen is listed on
the SSE").
180 See, e.g., http://www.londonstockexchange.com/aim/companiesjlist.asp (last visited
Mar. 19,2001).
181 CME Registration Statement, supra note 15, at 5.
182 Euronext Press Release, New Step Toward Creation of Euronext: Shareholders Circu-
lar Sent to Euronext Shareholders (Aug. 7, 2000) available at
http:llwwwv.bourse-de-paris.fr/en/news7/p77252.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2001)
("EURONEXT shares will be listed on EURONEXT as soon as it is practicable after the
closing date.").
183 Don Cruickshank referred to the LSE as "a commercial company - in due course a
listed company - subject to the ordinary commercial disciplines of the market economy."
See Don Cruickshank, Speech, supra note 106.
184 The Chairman of the ASX stated "We...decided to list which created great hilarity at
the time because we listed on ourselves, and that was seen as being a very strange thing to
do. But we needed to list somewhere and it seems to have worked quite well. From an opera-
tional perspective, essentially listing has energised the ASX to become focused on what it
was doing and to become more responsive to its customer demands and market develop-
ments." Humphry, supra note 77.
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The Australian solution to the problem of an exchange listing its own
shares is to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for monitoring compliance
by the exchange with listing requirements to the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission ("ASIC"). 85 The Australian Stock Exchange re-
tains the general responsibility for regulating listings in Australia. This so-
lution appears to deal with conflicts of interest issues, although the cost is
that the body that supervises compliance by the ASX with listing require-
ments is not one which is generally in the business of monitoring compli-
ance with listing requirements.
The Australian strategy of listing its shares has produced a substantial
group of investors. When the exchange listed its securities in 1998 it had
606 shareholders who had been members before demutualization. In 2000,
the Exchange had about 16,000 shareholders, of whom about 385 were
original member shareholders.186 Slightly more than 10,500 shareholders
held 1000 or fewer shares. 87
VI. PROPRIETARY BUSINESSES AS REGULATORS
(PRIVATIZED REGULATION)
In many jurisdictions, financial regulation involves a significant com-
ponent of self-regulation.1 8  The reason for this is partly historical. Ex-
changes which grew from relatively informal beginnings found that they
needed to impose rules on market participants. In England, Bamards Act of
1734 made time bargains illegal, so that regulation of these transactions
was, necessarily, extra-legal.
189
The main justification for self-regulation in the financial context is that
self-regulatory bodies have expertise that external regulators might not have
access to.' 90 Self-regulation may have another advantage: the regulated
185 "ASIC supervised ASX's listing and undertakes the day-to-day supervision of its
compliance with the listing rules to ensure ASX is subject to the same independent scrutiny
as all other listed entities." ASX Overview and Structure, supra note 177.
186 See, ASX REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS 2000, 38 (2000) available at
http://www.asx.com.au/shareholder/pdf/AnnualReport2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
187 Id. at 63.
188 See, e.g., Supervisory Framework for Markets, supra note 8, at 11 ("In most jurisdic-
tions, the model has shifted from the pure self-regulatory model, so that both the market au-
thority and the regulator perform regulatory responsibilities. However, the extent to which
self-regulation is used varies.").
189 See, e.g., Michie, supra note 14, at 31.
190 See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Dynamic Markets, Timeless Principles, 2000 COLuM. Bus. L.
REv. 1, 7 (2000) ("For the better part of this century, self-regulation has proved effective, in
large part, because of its ground-level familiarity with the markets as well as its members'
activities."); HM Treasury, Financial Services and Markets Bill, Draft Recognition Re-
quirements for Investment Exchanges and Clearing Houses 2 (February 1999), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pub/html/reglfsmb.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2001) ("Ex-
changes and clearing houses will be experts in the operation of their own markets and will
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population may be more inclined to comply with self-regulatory rules than
with rules imposed by outsiders. It is sometimes argued that self-regulation
can impose a higher standard of conduct than legal rules can. 191 Pure self-
regulation would involve an unattractive prospect of financial firms "regu-
lating" themselves in their own interest,19 so regulatory schemes often pro-
vide for self-regulation within a statutory framework creating a regulator.1
93
In addition to the claims about the need for expertise in financial regulation,
those who promote the idea of self-regulation in a statutory context often do
so to achieve two potentially conflicting, objectives: to make the regulatory
scheme acceptable to the regulated population, and to convince outsiders
that the scheme is effective. Whether the "self' or the "regulatory" part of
the self-regulator's functions is emphasized may depend on the context, or
the viewpoint of the author of the description.
194
In the U.S., the regulators which oversee self-regulatory exchanges are
administrative agencies, which are clearly public bodies. In other jurisdic-
tions, the situation is more murky. The U.K.'s Financial Services Authority
is a private company limited by guarantee which was originally formed (as
the Securities and Investments Board) to act as the U.K.'s financial services
regulator, and was subsequently designated as the regulator. Although the
FSA exercises public powers, the new statute which is to form the basis of
the FSA's powers will require the FSA to have regard to principles of good
corporate governance in carrying out its functions. 95 This emphasis on
corporate governance underscores the private aspects of the FSA's position.
have strong incentives to ensure those markets are run in a safe and proper manner."); Dis-
cussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization, supra note 3, at 4.
191 See, e.g., Maitland, supra note 45, at 375 (reporting that a London Stock Exchange
representative before the Royal Commissioners told how the Exchange "did justice and en-
forced a higher standard of morality than the law can reach. And a terrible justice it is. Ex-
pulsion brings with it disgrace and ruin, and minor punishments are inflicted").
192 See, e.g., David P. McCaffrey & David W. Hart, WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF 75
(1998) (suggesting various reasons why exchange members might not act to prevent actions
that might harm investors' interests).
193 The U.K. adopted a scheme based on the U.S. scheme in its Financial Services Act
1986, supra note 5, after Jim Gower was appointed to Review Investor Protection in the
United Kingdom. See, LCB Gower, REvIEw OF INVESTOR PROTECTION: A DiscussioN
DOCUMENT, HMSO (1982); Gower, REvanw OF INVESTOR PROTECTION. REPORT: PART 1.,
1984 Cmnd. 9125; FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
INVESTOR PROTECTION, 1985 Cmnd. 9432.
194 See, e.g., L.C.B. Gower, Big Bang and City Regulation, 51 MOD. L. REv. 1, 9 (1988)
("The Stock Exchange was about to be recognised as the "competent authority" for the pur-
poses of those Directives, thus completing its transformation from a private club to a public
body...").
195 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, supra note 6, at §7. ("In managing its af-
fairs, the Authority must have regard to such generally accepted principles of good corporate
governance as it is reasonable to regard as applicable to it.").
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A change in the nature of a self-regulatory organization from a mutual
to a proprietary firm raises the question whether the need to pay attention to
the financial interests of shareholders, who may not be participants in the
market run by the firm, adversely affect the ability of the firm to exercise its
regulatory responsibilities.196 To the extent that the basis for delegating
regulatory responsibility to the firm is its expertise, the arguments for the
firm to continue as a regulator would seem to remain, although one might
expect a profit-oriented firm to focus on expertise in building markets,
rather than regulating them. Worse, the need to focus on profits for the
benefit of shareholders might result in an under-provision of regulation in
the market. Of course, the need for a mutual enterprise to focus on the in-
terests of its members might similarly result in an under-provision of regu-
lation in the market,197 and a proprietary exchange might have less need to
pander to the interests of members than a mutual exchange would. 19 The
fundamental question is whether the market can be relied upon to produce
the appropriate rules,1 99 and whether any supervisory authority over the
self-regulatory firm is adequate to ensure that the SRO's new orientation
does not adversely affect the level of regulation on the market.2°°  The
chairman of the Australian Stock Exchange has said that the ASX has
linked concerns of responsiveness to customers with those of maintaining
an orderly market "by saying the integrity of the market is not only valuable
196 See, e.g., Model for Effective Regulation, supra note 11, at 2 ("It may be appropriate
for established SROs...to reevaluate their overall structures, as market innovations force re-
thinking of the traditional roles of exchanges and market intermediaries. This process of re-
evaluation is occurring at a number of securities and futures exchanges around the world as
they consider whether demutualized, for-profit structures may allow them to be more re-
sponsive to the needs of market users through competitive forces.").
197 The Chairman of the ASX has suggested that the demutualized exchange is more re-
sponsive to brokers' interests now than in the past, because it sees the brokers as customers.
Humphry, supra note 77 ("We have discovered we have got customers and that might sound
a simple thing to people from the private sector, it is not a simple thing when you are in an
organisation that is steeped in a different sort of process.").
198 See, e.g., Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization, supra note 4, at 5
("Where demutualization leads to a separation of the owners of an exchange from its mem-
bers, the interests of the owners may act as a constraint on actions that would benefit the in-
terests of the member firms.").
199 "If exchanges face near perfect competition in the supply of financial transactions ser-
vices, the economics are quite simple and direct: exchanges adopt efficient rules and govern-
ance structures because they will not survive otherwise. In contrast, if exchanges possess
market power or are protected by entry barriers, things are much more interesting. Profit-
maximizing members have an incentive to create rules and organizational structures that al-
low them to exploit this power." Pirrong, supra note 77, at 438.
200 HM Treasury Financial Services and Markets Bill, supra note 190, at 2. ("In describ-
ing the circumstances in which it is appropriate to allow exchanges to exercise regulatory re-
sponsibilities the document states "the Government believes that it is in the public interest to
ensure that where such bodies can be relied upon to maintain certain standards, as set out in
the recognition requirements, the regulatory regime should allow them a wide degree of
freedom to set and police their own market rules.").
Demutualization of Financial Exchanges
21:657 (2001)
to us as a matter of principle, it is actually valuable to us as part of the asset
base of the ASX."20' Richard Grasso of the NYSE made a similar argument
when he said, "Our commitment to strong self-regulatory function is a fun-
damental part of our long-term ambition for the Exchange: to remain the
trusted marketplace of choice." 202
These market-based arguments, that exchanges will continue to act
properly as for-profit regulators, are not convincing to the extent that the
exchange has a monopoly with respect to a particular function. This issue
could arise if an exchange is a regulator of the operator of an alternative
trading system that competes for trades with the exchange.20 3
Critiques of the market as a regulator of firm behavior often focus on
arguments that markets have short time horizons, therefore encouraging
managers of corporations to focus on short-term strategies, rather than on
longer-term strategies which might have greater payoffs.204 In the context
of an exchange, this would be a problem if the exchange decided to forgo
investment in technology on the grounds that such investment was expen-
sive and would harm shareholder value, where the failure to invest would
prejudice the ability of the exchange to compete in the future. Note that this
hypothetical assumes that the market will penalize exchange investments in
technology for the future. It may be that there is enough consensus in the
market that exchanges need to invest significant amounts of resources in
technology so this is not an issue. Another problem might arise if an ex-
change decided to relax listing standards in order to attract new listings,
205
201 Humphry, supra note 77; see also, Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualiza-
tion, supra note 4, at 5 ("Where a reputation as a fair and efficient market is seen to be a
competitive advantage (or the lack of one as a significant disadvantage), a for-profit ex-
change may have more resources available and greater incentives to devote those resources
to activities that enhance that reputation.').
202 Grasso, supra note 12.
203 See, e.g., Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization, supra note 4, at 6
("The conflicts inherent in an exchange regulating its competitors become more apparent
where the exchange is also a for-profit enterprise.").204 See, e.g., Grant Samuel's report on the Sydney Futures exchange's demutualization
proposal in Proposal to Mutualize, Information Memorandum, supra note 82, at 176 (noting
arguments that "the market places pressure on management to deliver short-term profit per-
formance with little regard to long term profits."). Cf, Swiss Re, supra note 25, at 12 ("The
management of a mutual insurer has the flexibility to undertake initiatives in the long-term
interest of policyholders that may not bear fruit initially...Publicly traded stock companies
often lack this flexibility because they are under constant pressure to report financial results
that meet or surpass investor expectations.").
205 For a suggestion that exchanges may feel pressure to relax standards, see, e.g., How-
ard Davies, Chairman, Financial Services Authority, "Global Markets, Global Regulation,"
IOSCO Annual Conference, Sydney, May 17, 2000, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/sp45.htrnl (last visited Feb. 20, 2001) ("In London, for
example, we have reached the conclusion that one exchange, which is competing with oth-
ers, should not be the national listing authority. That function transferred to us, along with its
staff, on 1 May. I have to say I feel more comfortable now with that responsibility in-house,
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and maximize revenues, rather than maintaining a higher standard for list-
ing in order to maintain the value of the exchange as a premium brand.20 6
In thinking about whether demutualized exchanges should act as regu-
lators, one might distinguish between the regulation of listings and the regu-
lation of trading, because traditional exchanges act as regulators of both.2°7
When the LSE decided to demutualize, the exchange, the Treasury, and the
Financial Services Authority agreed that the LSE should no longer act as
the U.K.'s competent authority for listings, and that this function should be
transferred to the Financial Services Authority.208  This development was
apparently, not one that was forced on the Exchange, but one that it
sought.209 The exchange retains the authority to set rules for admission of
securities to trading, and to regulate trading.210 There are close links, how-
particularly when there are considerable pressures to relax listing standards to take account
of the particular circumstances of new economy stocks. I am not saying that no change in
listing requirements is possible. Indeed we have made some changes in the U.K.. But my
personal view is that the public interest arguments can be better weighed by statutory regula-
tors in this new environment, than by a profit-seeking exchange. And I am encouraged in
that view by the fact that the London Stock Exchange itself reached the same conclusion.").
206 Note that this hypothetical assumes that the shareholder-value maximizing strategy
would be to relax listing standards in order to attract new listings. It is possible that in a truly
competitive market for listings the market would value higher quality listings more highly
than lower quality listings. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Brands vs. Generics: Self-Regulation by
Competitors, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 15, 19 (2000) ("If the NYSE and NASDAQ wish
to preserve their brands, they can do so through self-regulatory efforts so that issuers who list
their shares on the NYSE or NASDAQ further signal to the investment community their
commitment to ensure transparency, fair treatment of shareholders, and efficient execution
of securities trades. That is, the NYSE and NASDAQ can preserve their franchises through
strong self-regulatory efforts that preserve, and even enhance, the reputational gains of their
listed companies.").
207 Exchanges also regulate the conduct of their members towards their customers.
208 See HM Treasury News Release: Financial Services Authority to Become U.K.'s
Competent Authority for Listing Announces Gordon Brown, 158/99, 4 October 1999, avail-
able at http:llwww.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press/1999/p158_99.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2001); see Official Listing of Securities (Change of Competent Authority) Regulations
(2000), SI 2000/968. (Note that the plan for transfer envisaged transfer to the FSA of most of
the people who worked for the U.K. Listing Authority when it was part of the Exchange).
See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TRANSFER OF THE U.K. LISTING AUTHORITY TO
THE FSA, 12 (December 1999), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp37.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2001).2 09 See News Release, supra note 208 ("But in light of its proposal to demutualise and
turn itself into a commercial company, the Exchange has suggested that it would no longer
be appropriate for it to continue to exercise its Listing Authority function.").
210 See Transfer of the U.K. Listing Authority, supra note 208, at 9 ("It will be for the
LSE, Tradepoint and any other recognised investment exchange (RIE) to decide whether it
wishes to permit trading in any listed security, and to decide what procedures and standards
apply to the admission to trading process on an ongoing basis."); RIEs may decide to allow
trading of securities that are not officially listed. See, id. at 11. The distinction between list-
ing and trading also means that the UKLA will have the power to suspend listings, whereas
the exchanges will have the power to suspend trading in securities. See, id. at 16.
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ever, between listing rules and trading rules, and the FSA has recognized
that the need for the Exchange to compete with other markets in terms of its
trading rules may result in an adjustment to listing rules.2n This solution to
the perceived problem of having a for-profit entity act as a regulator may
entail a loss of regulatory expertise, 212 although the LSE retains the right to
make decisions about admission of securities to trading, and may continue
to exert some influence on the content of the listing rules.213
In contrast to the London Stock Exchange, the Australian Stock Ex-
change continues to act as the regulatory body for listings in Australia, set-
ting and applying the listing rules, although ASIC monitors the ASX's own
compliance with the listing rules.214 The ASX has decided to establish a
new entity as part of its regulatory structure. 21 5 The Australian authorities
have greater freedom than the authorities in the U.K., because the U.K.'s
ability to decide on the content of its own listing rules is constrained by its
membership in the EU, and the need to comply with harmonized standards
for listing in the EU.216 To the extent that the ability to relax listing stan-
dards is useful in the competition to attract listings,21 7 Australia would,
211 Transfer of the U.K. Listing Authority, supra note 208, at 5 ("The separation of ad-
mission to listing and admission to trading standards, in a world of multiple exchanges trad-
ing the same shares, raises the prospect of allowing some adjustment to existing listing rules
to facilitate competition between exchanges on trading standards.").2 12 See, e.g., Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization, supra note 4, at 7-8
(noting potential loss of synergy between regulatory functions and market operation on
transfer of regulatory functions to a regulator). The U.K. idea of transferring personnel may
not work to overcome this disadvantage in the long term. Although initially the personnel
responsible for regulating listings may be the same, over time, this will change.
213 See, e.g., London Stock Exchange Information Memorandum, supra note 46, at 17-18
("After the transfer of the role of Competent Authority, the Exchange will continue to work
closely with the FSA in its new role as Competent Authority to ensure that the Exchange's
markets continue to provide effective and competitive services to meet the needs of domestic
and international issuers and investors.").
214 Supra note 185. For the ASX's Listing Rules; see also
http://wvv.asx.com.au/about/13/ListingRulesAA3.shtm (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
215 ASX has formed AXS Supervisory Review Pty. Ltd. to complement proposed
amendments to corporation law formalizing ASIC's ability to audit supervisory arrange-
ments of market operators. Australian Stock Exchange, Media Relesase, AXS's Supervisory
Arrangements (Nov. 9, 2000), available at
http:/www.asx.com.au/shareholder/pdf/supervision091 100.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
216 See, e.g., Transfer of the U.K. Listing Authority, supra note 208, at 7-8 (briefly
describing the framework of EU legislation within which the U.K. Listing Authority
operates). See also, id. at 9 (distinguishing between admission to listing "in accordance with
the relevant European Community directives and U.K. legislation" and admission to
tradi dzl.'.,, it assumes a race to the bottom in the regulation of listings, rather than a struggle
to the top. For an argument that issuers may want to seek out high quality listings, see, e.g.,
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future As History: The Prospects For Global Convergence In Cor-
porate Governance And Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 674 (1999) ("One explana-
tion for the abnormal price movement on a U.S. listing is that such a listing represents a
bonding mechanism: the foreign issuer is increasing the share value of its public shares by
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:657 (2001)
therefore seem to be better placed to be competitive in attracting listings
than the U.K. There is some scope for the U.K. to engage in competition
for relaxed rules, as U.K. rules exceed EU requirements in some ways,218
and the U.K. authorities are conscious of the need to be internationally
competitive. 2 9 As well as recognizing the need to compete in terms of
standards, the FSA also recognizes that listing fees must be competitive.220
To the extent that demanding listing standards are useful in the competition
to attract listings, this ability to relax the rules may not matter.
The Toronto Stock Exchange adopted a third model of resolving prob-
lems of conflicts between regulatory responsibilities and responsibilities to
shareholders, by separating the market regulation function from the busi-
ness operations of the exchange.221
The NASD proposes to follow this third model by separating owner-
ship of Nasdaq (the market) from the ownership of NASD (the regulator). 222
NASD proposes to maintain only a minority ownership interest in
Nasdaq.223 NASD, separated from Nasdaq, also plans to offer its services
as a regulator to other markets, and other regulators within and outside the
agreeing to comply with the generally higher disclosure standards that prevail in the United
States.").
218 See, e.g., Transfer of the U.K. Listing Authority, supra note 208, at 8.
219 See, e.g., Transfer of the U.K. Listing Authority, supra note 208, at 8-9 ("The
UKLA's responsibilities...include: ... ensuring that the listing rules keep pace with market
developments as well as keeping a watchful eye on the regimes of comparable international
markets to ensure that the U.K. market remains competitive.").220 See, e.g., Transfer of the U.K. Listing Authority, supra note 207, at 13.
221 See, e.g., TSE Regulation Services - Press Release: TSE Regulation Services Intro-
duces Minimum Compliance Procedures for Trading Supervision (Dec. 4, 2000),
http://www.tsers.com/newsrel/rsnews_0l.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001) ("Following the
demutualization of the TSE, the market regulation function is now separate from its
for-profit business operations. This new division is named TSE Regulation Services or TSE
RS. TSE Regulation Services provides the TSE marketplace with effective self-regulation of
market conduct in a responsive and neutral manner.").
222 Glauber, supra note 71 ("In an era where exchanges and their competitors act more
like for-profit, public companies than traditional utilities, regulation benefits from being in-
dependent of market operations. A self-regulator will never be seen as being independent
when it regulates both its own market and that of competitors."); Cf. Arthur Levitt, supra
note 190 at 7 ("At the very least, I believe that strict corporate separation of the
self-regulatory role from the marketplace it regulates is a minimum for the protection of in-
vestors in a for-profit structure."). NASD Regulation was created in 1996 as part of a re-
structuring of the NASD, "a major feature of which was to separate the regulation of the
broker/dealer professional from the operation of The Nasdaq Stock Market." NASDAQ,
AMEX Backgrounder, available at
http://www.nasdaqnews.com/about/about2Of.htn#Regulation,Inc. Oast visited Apr. 17,
2001). NASD Regulation became an independent subsidiary of the NASD. Id.
2" See id.
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U.S.224 Within the U.S., the NASD sees one opportunity in the conversion
of electronic communications networks (ECNs), 25 such as the Island226 and
Instinet227 to exchange status. One consequence of such conversion would
be that the new exchange would take on regulatory responsibilities.228 The
NASD proposes that the ex-ECN exchanges should outsource their regula-
tory functions to it.229 NASD envisages a future as a participant in a market
for regulatory services, in which the market will monitor its provision of
these services.230 In contrast, the NYSE suggests that spinning off NYSE's
regulatory functions into a separate entity would do lasting damage to the
NYSE brand.231 At the NYSE "our self-regulatory duties literally permeate
every part of the exchange. Severance of them would be both culturally and
practically, impossible." '
One consideration relevant to the question of whether a proprietary ex-
change should be allowed to exercise self-regulatory responsibilities might
be where the exchange's revenues come from. An exchange might be able
to attract significant revenues for listings by producing listing rules issuers
regard as desirable (whether such rules would be the ones investors would
want, or not).233 Revenues from trading on the exchange may be a more
224 Glauber, supra note 71. ("A second new strategic initiative we plan is to offer our
regulatory services to other exchanges and regulators, again both here in the U.S. and
abroad.").
225 Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs) are regulated by the SEC under Rule
17a-23. 17 CFR § 240.17a-23 (April, 2000) (Recordkeeping and reporting requirements re-
lating to broker-dealer trading systems.). ECNs match buy and sell orders electronically.
226 See, e.g., the Island site at www.isld.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2001). A group of pri-
vate equity firms agreed to acquire a majority stake in Island at the end of 2000. Island Press
release: Leading Investor Group to Acquire Majority Interest in Island ECN, (Dec. 1, 2000),
available at http://www.island.compressrooni/releases/120100.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2001). Island announced that it planned to step up its efforts to become the U.S.' first for-
profit exchange. See id.
227 See, e.g., the Instinet site at http://www.instinet.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2001). Insti-
net is owned by Reuters.
22' See 15 U.S.C. §78f(b)(1) (An exchange shall not be registered as a national securities
exchange unless the SEC determines that it is "so organized and has the capacity to be able
to carry out the purposes of this Act and to comply, and...to enforce compliance by its mem-
bers and persons associated with its members, with the provisions of this Act, the rules and
regulations thereunder, and the rules of the exchange.").229 See Glauber, supra note 71. ("When they do, under federal law they must take on self-
regulatory obligations to police trading activity. We believe these new exchanges will find it
efficient to outsource this self-regulatory task."). The juxtapositioning of"outsourcing" with
"self-regulatory" is intriguing.
230 See Glauber, supra note 71. ("To get and keep members who sign up voluntarily, we
have to do a good job. Our members have to face this kind of market discipline every day.
NASD will benefit from the same experience.").
231 Grasso, supra note 12.232 id.
23 At the end of 1999 OM Stockholm Exchange had 300 listed companies. See OM
Stockholm Exchange, Fact Book 1999, 15, available at
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significant component of many exchanges' revenues than revenues from
234listings, so more exchanges may want to compete for this business. In
fact, alternative trading systems and newer markets are competing with ex-
changes for trades, not for listings. Competition for trades is more compli-
cated than competition for listings, because it involves technology as well
as rules. Even assuming good rules attract business, a less well-regulated
market with better technology might attract more business. When it comes
to competition between exchanges to attract broker-dealers as members to
be regulated by the exchange, there are greater concerns.
The IOSCO Technical Committee suggests four possible responses to
conflicts of interest in a self-regulatory environment: corporate governance
requirements; regulatory oversight; transparency; and functional separation
of commercial and regulatory functions. 3  These different responses have
been adopted in different places, but all have potential weaknesses. Ex-
changes that demutualize do emphasize their governance arrangements,23 6
but exchange governance arrangements are likely to share the weaknesses
of governance arrangements in other corporate enterprises. Perhaps more
significantly, corporate governance measures are usually seen as solutions
to the agency cost problem inherent in large corporations, rather than as
measures to ensure protection of the public interest. Even in jurisdictions
that have adopted corporate law structures to account for the interests of
groups other than shareholders, these structures have tended to privilege the
interests of employees,2 37 rather than the wider public interest.
Some exchanges have decided to deal with concerns about conflicts of
interest by separating regulatory functions from market operation fimc-
http://domino.omgroup.comtwww[WebTransaction.nsf/PublicUS/factbook/Sfile/Fakta99e.pd
f. The ASX had 1,381 listed companies at 30 June, 2000. See ASX, Report to Shareholders,
supra note 186, at 6.
234 Trading related revenues represent the largest component of total revenues for the OM
Stockholm Exchange. OM Stockholm Exchange, supra note 233, at 10.
235 Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization, supra note 2, at 7.236 See, e.g., LSE Information Memorandum, supra note 46, at 24 (stating that "[t]he
board intends to move to a structure which conforms with the Combined Code on Corporate
Governance, with a majority of the non-executive directors being independent, as defined in
the Combined Code."). Id. at 24-25 (describing composition of board committees.). See also
Levitt, supra note 190, at 7 ("I appeal especially to public directors to jealously guard the
self-regulatory standards of the markets they oversee, particularly listing standards."). See
also the NASD's statement that the NASD Regulation Board "has an equal mix of public
representatives and industry professionals" which "ensures that NASD Regulation is an open
organization with significant public participation in all its deliberations pertaining to regula-
tory policy and rule making," NASDAQ, NASDAQ Backgrounder, available at
http://www.nasdaqnews.com/about/backgrounder2.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
237 See, e.g., Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative
Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 555,
561-565 (2000) (describing provisions for worker involvement in supervisory boards of
German corporations).
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tions.238 When an exchange does this, however, there is a delicate issue of
how the regulatory entity maintains its expertise while also maintaining its
separation from the market entity. Transparency of the exchanges' regula-
tory arrangements may help to reduce concerns about conflicts of interest
because the exchange should take care to avoid the appearance of impropri-
ety. While transparency may derive from the demands of the market, or of
regulators,239 if neither the market nor the regulators demand transparency,
it is unlikely to generate spontaneously.
Critical to the usefulness of these proposed solutions is a mechanism
for monitoring how the exchange applies them. To the extent that the con-
cerns about the role of a proprietary exchange as a regulator are concerns
about how the exchange responds to the interests of non-shareholder con-
stituencies, market constraints are unlikely to ensure good governance, or
an appropriate separation between regulatory and market operation func-
tions. It is not obvious that the market will require an adequate level of
transparency. Thus, there remains a need for a regulator to oversee the pro-
prietary exchange when it acts as a regulator. In practice, regulators do em-
phasize their oversight of demutualized exchanges. On the other hand, one
might wonder whether this oversight is really meaningful. Regulators may
feel pressure to defer to the expertise of exchanges. Moreover, increas-
ingly, regulators seem to feel that they need to act to protect the competitive
position of exchanges.240
VII. COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION OF EXCHANGES
Exchanges compete with each other in terms of pricing, efficiency, and
standards. In addition, they may decide to specialize in particular sectors of
the market, or in particular financial products. The Toronto Stock Ex-
change's demutualization was accompanied by an agreement between the
Canadian exchanges to specialize. Trading in senior equities now takes
place in Toronto, the Alberta and Vancouver exchanges merged to form the
Canadian Venture Exchange and derivatives trading takes place on the
Montreal Exchange.24' The Toronto Stock Exchange has also suggested
238 See, e.g., text at note 220.
239 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires issuers of securities with assets over $1
million and 500 stockholders to register their securities. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g). Registration un-
der the Exchange Act entails an obligation to make regular disclosures to the markets.
NYMEX's and CME's disclosures are available from http://www.freeedgar.com.
240 Note that the SEC has proposed revising the requirements for SROs to file proposed
rule changes with the SEC in order to help the SROs "to be more competitive in today's
marketplace." See Proposed Rule Changes of Self-Regulatory Organizations, supra note
121, at 8912.
241 Restructuring of the Canadian Exchanges, available at
http://www.tse.com/tseinc/restruct.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
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that it thinks that it has a future as a center for trading in natural resources
stocks.
2 42
In the U.S., the national market system has involved a number of re-
gional exchanges which retain their separate identities, 243 but which are also
linked.24  Much of the debate in the U.S. is about the terms of the link-
ages,245 rather than about the desirability of encouraging the different ex-
changes to merge. Europeans have been discussing the idea of creating a
European securities market for a number of years, but little movement in
the direction of such a market has occurred until recently. In the early
1990s people would debate which of the main European exchanges would
dominate the European market: would London hold its own, or would
Frankfurt or Paris succeed in taking business from London? However,
competition between exchanges based in different jurisdictions is not just a
European phenomenon. Regulators recognize this. When the SEC granted
a limited volume exemption to the Tradepoint exchange, it did so on the ba-
sis that Tradepoint remained a low-volume exchange in its home jurisdic-
tion.246
Now, it seems that increased competition between financial exchanges
and between exchanges and non-exchange markets are producing pressures
for exchanges to merge with each other. The Paris, Amsterdam and Brus-
sels stock exchanges are merging to form Euronext.247 After its demutuali-
242 Blueprint for Success, supra note 69, at 18 (noting that "mining companies listed on a
Canadian exchange receive greater coverage and exposure to the global market, which often
results in higher valuation multiples for these companies.").
243In addition to the NYSE and AMEX, the U.S. has the Boston Stock Exchange
(http://www.bostonstock.com/), the Pacific Stock Exchange (http://www.pacificex.corn/),
and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (http://www.phlx.com/). Nasdaq acquired AMEX in
1998. See NASDAQ, NASDAQ Backgrounder, 3, available at
http://www.nasdaqnews.com/aboutbackgrounder2.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2001).
244 On the National Market System, see, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock,
Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 2 U. ILL. L. REv. 315
(1985); Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SECs Na-
tional Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 883 (1981).
245 See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42450; Commission
Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, 65 Fed. Reg. 10577,
10578 (28 February, 2000) ("the Commission is evaluating whether the national market sys-
tem will continue to meet the needs of investors by: (1) maintaining the benefits of vigorous
quote competition and innovative competition among market centers; (2) encouraging and
rewarding market participants (including both investors and dealers) who contribute to pub-
lic price discovery by displaying trading interest that is widely accessible and can be easily
executed by other market participants; (3) assuring the practicability of best execution of all
investor orders, including limit orders, no matter where they originate in the national market
system; and (4) providing the deepest, most liquid markets possible that facilitate fair and
orderly trading and minimize short-term price volatility.").246 Tradepoint Limited Volume Exemption, supra note 124, at 14957.
247 See, e.g., Euronext Corporate Brochure available at
http://www.euronext.com/pdf/Corporate-brochure-en.pdf ; Euronext Comprehensive Paper
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zation in March 2000, the LSE proposed to merge with the Deutsche B6rse
and form a market to be called iX- International Exchanges PLC.248 Oppo-
sition to this proposed merger helped to create a situation where the LSE
looked vulnerable to takeover. OM Gruppen ("OM") made an offer to take
over the LSE,249 and the LSE pulled out of the deal with Deutsche B6rse.
250
The LSE's defense documents pointed out that a significant proportion
of the consideration being offered to LSE shareholders consisted of OM
stock, and argued that the value of this stock was uncertain.5 1 In addition,
the LSE argued that OM's technology was unproven, and that its owner-
ship, governance and control raised "numerous questions. 25 2 Part of the
LSE's objection to OM's ownership was that 9.5% of its shares were, at the
time of the takeover attempt, owned by the Swedish Government, and the
LSE stated that if Sweden were to hold 10% of the shares it would acquire
rights to prevent a third party gaining full control of OM.2 2
Eventually the LSE succeeded in fighting off OM's attack. 4  But
Gavin Casey, the LSE's Chief Executive, lost his job.255  The LSE an-
at http://www.euronext.com/enleuronextinfo/publicationscomprehensive_paper/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2001). Euronext has an agreement with the Luxembourg stock Exchange. See Eu-
ronext Press Release, Agreement Between Euronext and Bourse De Luxembourg (Nov. 16,
2001), available at http:llwwv.bourse-de-paris.fr/en/news7/p77263.htm(last visited Feb. 21,
2001).
248 See, e.g., LSE Press Release, Outline of iX-intemational exchanges strategy and
merger benefits; International group of key market users to advise board; Board members
nominated, July 17, 2000, available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/press/releases/17-07-OO.asp (last visited Feb. 19,
2001); Joint statement by the U.K. and German supervisory authorities on regulatory issues
concerning IX-international exchanges ple, FSA/PN/1 11/2000 Aug. 21, 2000, available at
http:llwww.fsa.gov.uklpubslpressl2000/11 I.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
249 See, e.g., Nigel Dudley, Modernizer plots London Takeover, EUROMONEY, Oct. 2000,
at 42.
250 See LSE Press Release, LSE to Focus on Defeating OM Bid - iX Merger Proposal
Withdrawn, (Sept. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.compress/releases/12-0 9-00.asp (last visited Mar. 1,
2001) (announcing that the merger proposal was being withdrawn to allow the LSE to focus
on defending itself against OM's hostile bid.).
71 See, e.g., London Stock Exchange Defence Document, 1 (Oct. 2000), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/defencepdfs/80898.PDF (last visited Feb.16, 2001).
22 id.
253 Id.
254 See, e.g., LSE Press Release, London Stock Exchange PLC, 10 Nov. 2000, available
at http://vww.londonstockexchange.com/press/releases/10-11-OO.asP (last visited Feb. 19,
2001) (noting OM's announcement that it had failed to receive sufficient acceptances for its
hostile offer.).
255 See LSE Press Release, Chief Executive to step down, Sept. 15, 2000, available at
http://wwwv.londonstockexchange.com/press/releases/15-09-OO.asp (last visited Feb. 19,
2001). In January, 2001 it was announced that Clara Furse would be the new Chief Execu-
tive of the LSE. See LSE Press Release, Appointment of Chief Executive, Jan. 24, 2001,
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nounced the formation of an advisory group in December 2000,256 and an-
nounced new independent directors in February 200 1.257
The lesson from the OM attack on the LSE is that the same changes in
decision-making procedures that should allow demutualized exchanges to
open up possibilities for friendly linkages with other markets,251 will also
make the exchanges vulnerable to not-so-friendly predators. It is often eas-
ier for firms to grow through acquisitions than it is to grow organically. In
theory a new exchange could start up and challenge established exchanges,
but it would take time for the new exchange to grow its market to a level of
depth and liquidity that would challenge established exchanges. 9  So, in
theory, and in practice, proprietary exchanges may be subject to the threat
of take-over,260 or at least to control by one or more persons.261
A large amount of literature suggests that the market for corporate con-
trol is a useful mechanism for ensuring that corporate managers act in the
interests of their shareholders.2 62 One might expect that if proprietary ex-
changes were really taking seriously the idea of ownership as a spur to
greater efficiency, they would welcome the disciplinary effects of the mar-
ket for corporate control. In fact, demutualized exchanges tend to have
available at http://londonstockexchange.com/press/releases/24-01-01.asp (last visited Feb.
19, 2001).
26 See LSE Press Release, Membership of New Consultative Group Announced, Dec. 7,
2000, available at http:llwww.londonstockexchange.com/press/releases/07-12-OO.asp (last
visited Feb. 19, 2001).
257 See LSE Press Release, Exchange Announces Board Changes, Jan. 24, 2001, avail-
able at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/press/releases/24a-01-01.asp (last visited Feb.
19, 200 1). The Exchange described the increase in the number of independent non-executive
directors as "providing a board structure to its commercial plc status" and as fulfilling "the
commitment to sound corporate governance that the Exchange gave when it demutualised in
Mar. 2000." Id.258 Blueprint for Success, supra note 69, at 5 ("Alliances are a means of pursuing the
conventional wisdom that "liquidity attracts liquidity.").
259 On Feb. 28, 2001 Island (which was set up in 1997) executed 1,265,106 trades in rela-
tion to 381,958,468 shares for a dollar volume of $13,544,757,456.14, at
http://www.isld.comfvolumelindex.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2001). Island posts summaries
of its quarterly filings with the SEC at http://www.isld.com/resources/secl7a23/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2001). On the same date, the NYSE reported 1,263,918 trades in re-
spect of 1,225,192,975 shares for a dollar volume of $45,591.2 million.
260 The Sydney Futures Exchange recognized this risk when it proposed demutualization.
See SFE, Information Memorandum, supra note 82, at xv.
261 The IOSCO Technical Committee suggests the public interest might require mecha-
nisms such as restricting maximum share ownership, or requiring regulatory approval for
ownership over a certain threshold. Discussion Paper on Stock Exchange Demutualization,
supra note 4, at 9.262 See, e.g., THE DEAL DECADE (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993); Note that Julian Franks
and Colin Meyer have suggested that takeovers are more effective in disciplining poorly per-
forming corporate managements in the U.S. than in the U.K. Julian Franks & Colin Meyer,
Governance as a Source of Managerial Discipline, 3 (Apr. 2000), available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/franksreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2001).
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provisions in their constitutive documents (or in legislation that applies to
them)263 that restrict the percentage of votes that a single shareholder, or
groups of shareholders acting together, may exercise.264 The London Stock
Exchange's articles of association contain a provision whereby no person or
persons in the same group or acting in concert with each other may have an
interest in the Exchange's ordinary shares carrying more than 4.9% of the
total votes attaching to the LSE's ordinary shares.265 The LSE's board is
entitled to refuse to register transfers of shares where they would result in a
holding over this level.266 The Toronto Stock Exchange has the same re-
striction on the exercise of voting rights,267 as does Nasdaqz6 ' and the
ASX.269 The Sydney Futures Exchange allows a person to hold up to 10%
of the shares in the Exchange. Other exchanges have different protec-
tions against take-over. The CME introduced anti-takeover provisions into
its charter on its transformation from an Illinois not-for-profit corporation to
a Delaware for-profit corporation. 27' Euronext has adopted a poison pill
272provision.
It may be easier to protect firms against hostile takeovers in some ju-
risdictions than in others. Certainly, the protective techniques that are
available will vary. An exchange established in a jurisdiction allowing
strong protections against takeovers will more likely become a predator
than a target. The corporate laws of other jurisdictions may render some
exchanges more vulnerable to takeovers than others.273 On the other hand,
263 See ASX Report to Shareholders, supra note 186, at 38.
264 These provisions may be as much about avoiding domination of the exchange by one
or more controlling shareholders as about avoiding the market for corporate control. For a
suggestion that the danger of control might require restriction of maximum share ownership,
see supra note 261.265 See http://www.londonstockexchange.comdealing/default.asp (last visited Feb. 19,
2001). A proposal to remove this limit was defeated in Oct. 2000. See LSE Press Release,
Result of Extraordinary General Meeting, Oct. 19. 2000, available at
http:/vwwxv.londonstockexchange.com/press/releases/19c-10-00.asp (last visited Feb. 19,
2001).266 id.
267 The Toronto Stock Exchange plan involved an upper limit on voting rights of 5% of
the total votes. See Toronto Stock Exchange Information Circular, supra note 86, at 7-8.268 See Order approving Proposed Rule Change Amending the Nasdaq By-laws and Re-
stated Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 71.269 See ASX Report to Shareholders, supra note 186, at 38.
270 See SFE, Information Memorandum, supra note 82, at ix. The restriction applies for
five years from the date of demutualization. Id.
271 See CME Registration Statement, supra note 15, at 4.
272 See Don Cruickshank, Speech, supra note 106 ("Euronext has a typically continental
poison pill device that could automatically create enough new shares held by a mysterious
foundation to block any takeover.").
273 Companies in Britain are restricted in their ability to defend themselves against take-
over. For example, they may not buy their own shares, see § 143 Companies Act, 1985. The
Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry has announced plans to deregulate to allow
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even where protective provisions apply, an incumbent management team
may not feel comfortable about relying on them. For example, when OM
Gruppen attempted to acquire the LSE, shareholders in the LSE were of-
fered the opportunity of voting on whether to retain this restriction or not.274
Traditionally, different jurisdictions have had their own stock ex-
changes, and, more recently, the development of a stock exchange has been
perceived as necessary to show a commitment to capitalism.275 A country
might be nervous about the idea of its exchange being acquired by, or merg-
ing with, a foreign entity for a number of reasons.276 If it became harder for
domestic enterprises to raise capital in the market as a result of the acquisi-
tion, there would be a problem for the national economy.277 In addition,
there is the question of which rules should apply to the combined enterprise.
Should the different jurisdictions involved share responsibility for oversee-
ing the markets, or will there be a single lead regulator? Will the different
countries affected be able to agree about the right way to resolve the issue?
In the U.K., the threat of an acquisition of the LSE by a U.S. entity raises
companies to purchase shares to resell them at a later date. Dept. of Trade and Industry Press
Release, Purchase by Companies of Their Own Shares for Holding in Treasury: Kim
Howells Announces Proposed Change to the Law, P/99/1057 (Dec. 22, 1999), available at
http://www.dti.gov.uk/cldlbybakl96.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2001).
English companies may not provide financial assistance to others for the purchase of
shares in the company. §§ 151-158, Companies Act, 1985. The Government proposes to re-
lax these rules. See Dept. of Trade and Industry, Company Law Reform: Financial Assis-
tance by a Company for the Acquisition of its Own Shares - Outcome of the Nov. 1996
Consultation, (Apr. 1997), available at http://www.dti.gov.uklcld/finasst.pdf (last visited
Feb. 26, 2001).
Generally, where a company issues shares it may only issue them pro rata to existing
shareholdings. Id. at §§ 89-96. Other transactions may be challenged as a breach of the rules
restricting when distributions to shareholders may be made. See, e.g., Aveling Barford v. Pe-
rion [1989] BCLC 626 (holding that the sale of property at an undervalue was an unauthor-
ized return of capital).
274 The shareholders voted to retain the restriction. See LSE Press Release, Result of Ex-
traordinary General Meeting, October 19, 2000, available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/press/releases/19c-10-00.asp (last visited 30 Septem-
ber, 2001).
275 The Prague Stock Exchange's description of its history begins: "Emergence and evo-
lution of exchanges are tied to the very emergence and development of market economy."
See http://www.pse.cz/burza/historie.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2001). This document also
states that: "In the period between WW I and WW II, the exchange was undergoing a dy-
namic boom which was violently interrupted by the second World War. After that war, the
door of the exchange did not open. But the tradition of the Czech exchange business found
its continuation in the 1990s when the Preparatory Committee for the Foundation of the Pra-
gue Stock Exchange was set up, in May1991." Id.
276 The NYSE is "an important national asset." Market Structure Report, supra note 103,
at 17. The London Stock Exchange was described in the House of Lords as "the jewel in the
crown of British industry." Lord Saatchi, H.L. Debates, 24 May, col. 804.
277 This might be the case if the market grew to a point where its listing standards had to
be revised upwards to allow the listing only of very large issuers.
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the specter of having U.S. rules apply in the London market, which is re-
garded with skepticism by those in the U.K. 278 A very large exchange
based in more than one jurisdiction might be able to play off one regulator
against others by threatening to move its business offshore.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Managements of exchanges who promote the idea of demutualization
argue that it will bring the discipline of markets to the internal workings of
exchanges as businesses and allow them to compete against newer markets
and markets in other jurisdictions. Demutualization is meant to promote
more effective decision-making within the exchange and to allow for strate-
gic alliances with other businesses. The rhetoric is one of competition and
efficiency, with a heavy dose of market integrity as an essential element of
the exchange's brand. There are some real questions about whether all of
these benefits of demutualization will be realized.
This article focused on three problems associated with demutualiza-
tion: arrangements for trading in exchange shares, proprietary exchanges as
regulators, and the risk that a proprietary exchange will become a takeover
target.
Ensuring a liquid market in an exchange's shares is problematic. If the
exchange lists its shares on itself (and monitors its own listing), it risks
criticism. If it lists on a competitor it seems to lack confidence. If it does
not list the shares, the market will be relatively illiquid. How strong the
market is in the exchange's shares will affect the extent to which the market
really does discipline the exchange's management to manage the business
well. Although it is too early to tell, there are reasons to doubt whether
ownership by shareholders will really promote efficiency, especially where
the exchange is, to some extent, insulated from the threat of takeover.
Even if the management of a proprietary exchange does act to maxi-
mize shareholder value because of market discipline, non-shareholder inter-
ests, and the public interest in particular, may be ignored. Increasingly,
regulators seem to believe that they should not act to impede the ability of
exchanges to compete amongst one another. But exchanges have self-
regulatory responsibilities, and are a critical element of the financial regula-
tory system. Increased competition between exchanges and non-exchange
markets is likely to involve competition on regulation as well as technol-
ogy. Exchanges argue that the value of their brand depends on demanding
regulation, but where the risks of lax regulation are borne by non-
278 See, e.g., Don Cruickshank, Speech, supra note 106 ("I also predict that a U.S. tie up
or merger would raise another difficult issue, extraterritoriality - a horrible word meaning the
demand by the U.S. authorities - the SEC and Government combined - that their writ should
run over all the markets run by the new entity, especially if U.S. citizens were to have direct
access to a market in a member state of the EU.").
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shareholder constituencies, it is incumbent on the regulators to do more
than acquiesce in the exchanges' regulatory decisions.
Finally, the market for corporate control might encourage exchange
managements to act in the interests of shareholders, but there are other po-
tential costs in terms of reduced access to capital for domestic businesses,
and dangers of regulatory arbitrage. Each country has a national interest in
protecting its domestic capital markets for the benefit of domestic enterprise
and investors. If we allow exchanges the freedom to act just like any other
business, we risk undermining this national interest.
